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This paper builds on the underlying framework of Jacob and Levitt (2003) and further work by 
Gustafsson (2014) to determine the prevalence of cheating in South African schools using a 
nationally representative sample (Verification ANA) of the Annual National Assessments of 
2013. This research forms part of a broader research project on ‘binding constraints in 
education’ promoted by the Programme to Support Pro-poor Policy Development (PSPPD), 
housed at Stellenbosch University. The adapted methodology is verified in order to ensure that 
the suspicious string indicators as discovered by Jacob and Levitt are indeed indicative of 
suspicious behaviour when applied to the South African ANA. At a national level, the data 
suggests that cheating or suspicious behaviour is likely to be prevalent in up to 10 percent of 
schools with respect to Mathematics and Language in Grades 3 and 6. The manner in which 
schools behave suspiciously varies significantly by province, subject and measure. As many as 
37% of primary schools in the Eastern Cape, 26% of primary schools in KwaZulu-Natal and 
24% of primary schools in Limpopo show some evidence of cheating in Grade 3 mathematics, 
compared to just 0% to 2% of primary schools in the Western Cape and Gauteng. Similar 
extremes are noted in the Grade 6 results. These results suggest that the mere act of assessment 
and measurement induces behavioural distortions such as gaming behaviour even in the absence 
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This paper uses the theory of Jacob and Levitt’s (2003) paper, “Rotten Apples: an investigation 
of the prevalence and predictors of teacher cheating,” and later adaptive work by Gustafsson 
(2014) to provide an estimate of the prevalence of cheating in the South African Annual 
National Assessments of 2013. This research forms part of a broader research project on 
‘binding constraints in education’ promoted by the Programme to Support Pro-poor Policy 
Development (PSPPD) housed at the Research on Socioeconomic Policy (ReSEP) group at 
Stellenbosch University. It is as part of this research that the Verification ANA 2013 data was 
obtained and Gustafsson’s preliminary paper entitled “A check on item-level data patterns in the 
2013 ANA associated with possible cheating” was shared. Unfortunately this thesis was not 
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the cheating indicators as discovered by Jacob and Levitt are indeed indicative of suspicious 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
Effective educational systems have long been considered an important determinant of economic 
growth and as such sit at the heart of most development strategies (Lucas, 1988 and Mankiw et 
al., 1990). Improved educational outcomes reflect an increase in human capital which should 
result in a positive effect on individual earnings and overall lead to a strong positive effect on 
economic growth (Barro & Lee, 2010). The focus on improving educational outcomes used to 
be centered around the expansion of educational attainment but has recently shifted towards 
theories of improving educational quality as “schooling that does not improve cognitive skills, 
measured by comparable international tests of mathematics, science and reading, has a limited 
impact on aggregate economic outcomes and on economic development” (Hanushek & 
Woessmann, 2008, p.608). In an attempt to provide quality education, many governments have 
implemented accountability programmes with varied stakes (incentives and sanctions) based on 
performance measures which consistently assess and monitor student, and sometimes teacher, 
cognitive skills. A variety of researchers have found that improved performance on these tests is 
shown to be closely related to individual productivity and earnings (Hanushek, 2002; Lazear, 
2003; Mulligan, 1999; Murnane et al., 2000). The substantial magnitude of the impact of cognitive 
skills on economic returns indicates that “educational quality concerns are very real for 
developing countries [such as South Africa] and that this aspect of schools simply cannot be 
ignored” (Hanushek & Woessmann, 2008, p.621). 
According to the standards and accountability movement a series of three activities are needed in 
order to improve education: “first, defining what students should learn (setting standards); 
second, testing to see what students have learned (measuring achievement); third, making the 
results count (holding educators and students accountable)” (Loveless et al., 2005, p.7). Currently 
the South African education curriculum outlines the standards of content using the Curriculum 
Assessment Policy Statement (CAPS). The implementation and testing of these standards is 
handled by schools and these schools are held accountable to the Annual National Assessments 
(ANA) as stipulated by the Department of Basic Education (DBE). It would seem that South 
Africa has started to put in place the practises necessary to raise the standard of education 
delivered. There is, however, a growing concern that some strategic behaviour, or cheating, 
occurs during the implementation of these assessments, allowing schools who are 
underperforming to go unnoticed and unsanctioned.  
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The review report of the first ANA undertaken in 2011 titled “Report of the Annual National 
Assessments of 2011”  included some analysis of patterns in the item-level data for Grade 3 that 
suggested that some level of cheating may occur (Department of Education, 2011). Specifically it 
was found that, “in three provinces (Eastern Cape, KwaZulu-Natal and Limpopo), the degree of 
similarity between the responses to the same question by learners in the same school suggests 
that test administration procedures may not have been properly carried out” (Department of 
Basic Education, 2011, p.28). The report further states that in some schools these statistical 
anomalies may be driven by incorrect teaching within individual schools or classes (Department 
of Basic Education, 2011). Both cheating and incorrect teaching are particularly dangerous in 
education and hence these topics need to be further explored.  
This paper examines the topic using widely tested methods introduced by Jacob and Levitt in the 
United States (2003). This analysis focuses on the detection of ‘strange patterns’ in the data 
which points to cheating. These irregularities in the testing process could result from (a) 
assistance offered by teachers during the test, (b) student copying or (c) adjustments made to test 
scripts after the assessment. This paper will therefore use the underlying framework of Jacob and 
Levitt (2003) and further work by Gustafsson (2014) to determine the prevalence of cheating in 
South African schools using Verification ANA 2013 data. The results emanating from the 
Verification ANA data are likely to underestimate the prevalence of cheating for the very reason 
that the schools selected for the verification sub-sample had additional external personnel (from 
Deloitte) present at the schools (or rotating between the V-ANA schools) in order to monitor 
the implementation of the assessments. The additional monitoring under these conditions is 
likely to deter cheating.  
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Chapter 2: Literature Review 
 
2.1 The Importance of Education 
Education is a process which enables human beings and societies to reach their fullest potential. 
One of the main objectives of education is to increase the human capital of individuals with 
basic skills such as reading, writing and mathematics. The ripple effect of education, however, is 
much broader improving the lives of individuals and stimulating the economy through a number 
of mechanisms. Education increases the efficiency of individuals raising the earning potential of 
the labour force, fosters democracy creating better conditions for good governance (Barro, 1998 
and Bobba & Coviello, 2007), improves health and reduces fertility (Cutler et al., 2006 and 
D'Addio et al., 2005) and promotes equality (Aghion et al, 1999). Investment in education is 
therefore a key determinant of a country’s development process and as such is often the largest 
single line item of government expenditure (as is the case in South Africa). As such there is a 
strong incentive for government to ensure that these resources achieve the outcomes for which 
they were procured resulting in educational policy debates and continued restructuring of 
education systems in an effort to improve the accessibility and quality of education. Recent 
studies, however, conclude that “education investments [only] contribute to faster GDP growth 
if schooling is effective in raising student learning” (Bruns et al, 2011, p.142). This has led to a 
shift in the global focus on improving education towards a more stringent accountability system 
through government policy and international monitoring (Chiang, 2009; Cullen & Reback, 2006; 
Jacob & Levitt, 2003). Increased accountability should motivate all stakeholders through 
incentives and sanctions to raise the quality of education provided thereby offering students the 
means to lead a productive life consistent with sustainable development and effective public 
participation as set out in Agenda 21 of the United Nations (United Nations Decade of 
Education for Sustainable Development, 2002). 
2.2 Differing Degrees of Accountability 
In an attempt to improve the quality of education, many governments have implemented an 
accountability programme based on performance measures. The shift toward increased 
accountability aims to provide “adequate checks and incentives to ensure that teachers and 
school administrators maximise student learning” (Cullen & Reback, 2006, p1). The focus on 
student performance as a measure of the health of a school diverges from previous thinking 
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which stressed school budgets, resources and management to ensure provision of a standardised 
and acceptable level of education (Fuhrman & Elmore, 2004). This shift in thinking comes as a 
result of mounting evidence which reveals that “what students actually learn, not how many 
years of schooling they complete, is what counts for economic growth” (Bruns et al, 2011, p.4). 
This point highlights the quality of education offered over the quantity of education attained. 
There is a substantial body of evidence reflecting the varying degrees of accountability that have 
been employed by both developed and developing countries, and their relative impacts.   
Incentives and Sanctions – The United States of America   
The United States of America (USA) employs both incentives and sanctions in motivating 
stakeholders to improve educational quality. These policies have been widely implemented 
through the No Child Left Behind Act of the Bush administration in 2001 (Chiang, 2009). Under 
this Act schools administer a series of standardised math, literacy and language assessments to 
every student in grades three to eight. These tests are then used to grade schools A through F 
depending on student performance. The grading of schools is made public knowledge and 
schools repeatedly failing to meet performance standards are penalised accordingly which may 
include the redirection of funding, possible replacement of school leadership and or staff, state 
takeover of operations and in severe cases school closure (Figlio, 2006). Under this Act thirteen 
states use public reporting as the primary mechanism for attaching stakes to performance, 
nineteen states acknowledge exceptional performance with monetary or non-monetary rewards 
and nineteen states have specific policies enabling them to reconstitute schools and change staff 
(Goertz & Duffy, 2001). The public disclosure of school grades in some instances may increase 
the stakes associated with the accountability programme through the effect this information has 
on other markets. Figlio and Lucas (2000) provide evidence that housing markets are highly 
sensitive to school report cards, signalling the attractiveness and potential of an area.  
This new educational environment provides significant incentives for underperforming schools 
to alter the way in which they deliver their services and, in the United States increased 
accountability has typically resulted in a positive effect on the performance measures of students 
(Carnoy & Loeb, 2002; Hanushek & Raymond, 2004; Springer, 2008). Furthermore a cross-state 
analysis of varying degrees of accountability shows that students in high-accountability states 
average significantly higher scores on the National Association of Educational Progress (NAEP) 
math test (Carnoy & Loeb, 2002). This is the hope of the accountability programme, that 
threatened schools would restructure finances and resources in order to improve efficiency and 
raise performance standards. This is exactly the story outlined by Chiang (2009) who estimates 
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that the threat of sanctions from being graded as failing induced lasting student improvement of 
approximately 0.11 standard deviations in reading and math in the following year due to 
increased school expenditure on instructional and curricular development, reading coaches and 
specialised consultants, teacher training and technology.  
Incentives and Information – Brazil (Pernambuco) 
Brazil’s accountability initiative involves the dissemination of information and monetary rewards 
for improved performance. Pernambuco is plagued with very low educational outcomes, ranking 
last out of Brazil’s 26 states on the national education quality index (Ferraz & Bruns, 2011). In 
2008 Pernambuco became the third state to implement a group pay-for-performance system that 
uses large monetary rewards to incentivise school personnel to meet annual school improvement 
targets, the effects of which were studied by Ferraz and Bruns (2011). Improvement targets are 
set for each school, for grades 4, 8 and 11 on the SAEPE (Pernambuco State Learning 
Assessment) which tests Maths and Language annually. Information regarding current school 
performance and future school targets was sent to school principals and made available to the 
public via school notice boards (Ferraz & Bruns, 2012). All schools that reach at least half of 
their set targets are rewarded with a proportional bonus which could average over one month’s 
salary dependent on the number of schools reaching their targets. The significant incentives 
created by the design of this system resulted in an almost instant improvement in education with 
a 17 percent increase in the number of schools achieving their targets from 52 percent in the first 
year to 79 percent in the second year. The rewards received averaged approximately 1.8 months 
and 1.4 months of a recipient’s salary in the first two years of the programme respectively (Ferraz 
& Bruns, 2012). In addition, schools with more ambitious targets achieved greater improvements 
in student outcomes and classroom observations carried out just prior to the end-of-year student 
achievement exams revealed that “schools whose teachers spent more time on instruction were 
much more likely to achieve a bonus” (Ferraz & Bruns, 2012, p.4).   
Information only – India (Andhra Pradesh) and Kenya 
In the Indian state of Andhra Pradesh an information only campaign provides experimental 
evidence on the effectiveness of low-stakes accountability programmes. The majority (80 
percent) of children in rural Andhra Pradesh attend one of over 60 000 government-run schools 
(Pratham, 2008). With a high student to teacher ratio, strong teacher unions and a lack of 
disciplinary action, teacher attendance and performance is low (Kremer et al., 2005). Against this 
backdrop a set of 100 schools were randomly selected in the 2005-6 school year to receive 
baseline and endline academic tests, absolute and relative written diagnostic feedback to teachers 
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and low-stakes monitoring of classroom practices. Improved information is meant to inform 
teacher practice and should increase intrinsic motivation by “focussing attention on student 
learning levels and improving their ability to set and work towards goals” (Muralidharan & 
Sundararaman, 2010, p.2). Evaluation of this programme found significant impacts on the effect 
of information and low-stakes monitoring on teacher behaviour. In treatment schools “teachers 
were more likely to be observed actively engaged in teaching, using textbooks, engaging students, 
and using the blackboard” (Bruns et al, 2011, p.38). In spite of increased effort by teachers, 
students in treatment schools fared no better than those in control schools on endline 
assessments (Muralidharan & Sundararaman, 2010). Whilst increased information had no effect 
on student outcomes, it did induce a positive change in teacher behaviour.  
The effects of information provision on student performance vary widely by study. In a number 
of other contexts such as Liberia, Pakistan and Uganda, information for accountability has led to 
increased student performance (Bruns et al, 2011). However closer to home, a recent randomised 
educational intervention in Kenya has shown that information provision has no discernible 
effect on either private or collective action (Lieberman et al, 2014). In this study, public citizen 
activism and the private actions of those in the household are evaluated between those 
households that did and did not receive the randomised information package. The information 
disseminated to parents included the performance of their school-aged children as well as 
suggestions on materials and strategies that may improve their child’s learning. This initiative was 
shown to be unsuccessful as, “parents that received the informational treatments were no more 
likely than other parents to take action at school or in the public sphere to improve the quality of 
their children’s schooling or to adopt behaviours at home that might have a positive impact on 
their children’s learning” (Lieberman et al, 2014, p.70).   
International Comparisons and Benchmarks 
Many countries do not specifically have an educational accountability programme but may be 
covered by international studies. There are a number of benchmark assessments such as the 
Programme for International Student Assessment (PISA), the Progress in International Reading 
and Literacy Study (PIRLS) and the Trends in International Mathematics and Science Study 
(TIMSS). Locally, there is the Southern and eastern Africa Consortium for Monitoring 
Education Quality (SACMEQ). This study covers the conditions of schooling and quality of 
education in a host of southern and eastern African countries using reading and math 
assessments (Moloi & Chetty, 2010). SACMEQ, TIMSS and PIRLS have been particularly 
important for South Africa as, until recently, the matric school-leaving examinations were the 
7 
 
only resource available to evaluate educational progress. These studies monitor and report on the 
global standard of education and are useful in promoting public accountability through debate 
and pressure for reform (Bruns et al, 2011).  
2.3 Assumptions of New Accountability Systems 
There are five main assumptions underlying the new accountability systems such as those seen in 
the United States. According to O’Day (2004) in Redesigning Accountability Systems in Education 
these new systems assume that:  
 
- Performance, or student achievement, is the key value or goal of schooling, and constructing 
accountability around performance focusses attention on it. 
- Performance is accurately and authentically measured by the assessment instruments in use. 
- Consequences, or stakes, motivate school personnel and students. 
- Improved instruction and higher levels of performance will result. 
- Unfortunate unintended consequences are minimal. 
 
In application, however, these assumptions frequently fail. Whilst the first two points can be 
argued to fail on theoretical or philosophical grounds, the last three, which are of particular 
interest, can be said to fail in practice due to their human element. Consequences, or stakes, are 
incorporated into accountability programmes in order to incentivise individuals to act in the 
public interest. Attaching incentives in education may drive intrinsically motivated teachers to 
increase their effort and provide a higher standard of assistance to students. Accountability of 
teachers in less than ideal circumstances, where individual skill levels or organisational 
constraints exist, or whom are solely interested in seeking financial gain, may generate 
unintended outcomes as these individuals may elect to operate outside of or circumvent the 
system. “The difficulty with low performing teachers is that it is for them, in particular, that 
governments set standards and accountability stakes, but it is them, in particular, that have the 
least understanding of how to shift towards the standards” leaving them, at best, to comply 
superficially to external demands (Shalem, 2003, p.42). To the extent that school personnel are 
not motivated by stakes, the effort, instruction and quality of education provided will not 
improve and higher levels of performance will not result. This therefore means that the 
unfortunate unintended consequences of such accountability systems may be more prevalent 
than expected and the effect of these may be costly to students. 
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2.4 Gaming the System 
2.4.1 What is Gaming Behaviour?  
For those not motivated by the incentives and sanctions outlined in accountability programmes, 
high-stakes may result in unanticipated side effects as the system is “likely to induce behaviour 
distortions along other dimensions as agents seek to game the rules” (Jacob & Levitt, 2003, 
p.843). Whilst these stringent incentives and sometimes ruthless sanctions shock able teachers 
and other stakeholders into actively raising the quality of education they provide, those who are 
inadequate fear heavy sanctions and seek underhand methods of bolstering their performance. 
This is referred to as gaming the system or gaming behaviour. Holstrom and Milgrom (1991) 
find that accountability based on objective criteria will lead agents to focus on the most easily 
observable aspects of a multi-dimensional task. There is also a common belief that the 
performance measures associated with the accountability programme are flawed allowing agents 
to improve reported results without making actual progress on performance (Cullen & Reback, 
2006). This suggests that those who circumvent the system may not be detected under the guise 
of improved student performance. This will lead to little actual improvement in the quality of 
education students’ experience.   
2.4.2 Strategic Forms of Gaming Behaviour 
There are a number of ways in which teachers and academically bankrupt schools are able to 
game the system in order to meet performance benchmarks or reflect adequate improvement. 
These methods include teaching to the test, reshaping the test pool by suggesting students be 
held back or pushed out of a grade thereby manipulating dropout rates, excluding academically 
poor students from the assessments and classifying certain students as disabled or limited-
English (and therefore ineligible) These intentional acts reflect the manner in which assessment 
induces changes in teacher and sometimes student behaviour. 
Teaching to the test 
“There is increasing evidence that teachers’ ability to generate student learning is highly variable” 
(Bruns et al., 2011, p.142). In light of this and under threat of sanctions, at risk teachers may 
focus intently on high-stakes subjects, ignore critical aspects of learning that are not explicitly 
tested and neglect those students who have no bearing on the accountability grade in order to 
raise performance. This is known as teaching to the test. As the standards of content are detailed 
and complex, “the assessments thus become a primary vehicle for communicating what the 
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standards really mean, and provide a strong signal to teachers and schools about what they 
should be teaching and what students should be learning” (Fuhrman & Elmore, 2004, p.142). 
Through repeated exposure to the content and style of national assessments, teachers are able to 
focus their instruction on the narrow range of the curriculum which is bound to be tested. This 
effectively allows teachers to reallocate their time towards helping students memorise tested 
content. Priority may also be given to only those specific subjects that are tested which usually 
include English and Mathematics to the detriment of subjects such as Science, History, Biology 
and other content areas (Linn, 2004). In addition to narrowing the curriculum, teachers are also 
able to coach students according to the pedagogical approach represented by the test. If national 
assessments make use of multiple choice questions that stress memorisation and routine 
computation rather than a deep understanding of the material and problem solving skills then 
the latter are likely to be ignored in the classroom. This is confirmed by Jacob (2005) who finds 
that the introduction of high-stakes testing in Chicago led to sharp increases in reading and math 
scores which were driven primarily by increases in test-specific skills and a substitution away 
from non-tested subjects such as science and social studies. Teachers have also been found to 
dedicate their attention and resources on those students at the margin who could affect the 
overall school grade, “while not necessarily improving the performance of other students” 
(Cullen & Reback, 2006, p.2).   
Reshaping the test pool – holding back & increased punishment 
Another method of gaming the system in order to achieve perceived improved performance 
involves reshaping the test pool. There is significant evidence on the number of ways in which 
schools and their administrators have been able to achieve this. Figlio and Getzler (2002) as well 
as Jacob (2005) find that the introduction of high-stakes testing is associated with a significantly 
higher rate of disability classification. By strategically placing at-risk students in disability or 
limited English programmes these students, under some accountability policies, may be exempt 
from the assessments or may benefit from testing accommodations reserved for students with a 
legitimate disability. Testing accommodations such as extra time, a quiet venue and a limited 
curriculum could improve any student’s performance, falsely raising the proficiency percentage 
of disabled students and the proficiency percentage of mainstream students within the school. 
Figlio (2006, p.837) further finds that schools assign harsher punishments to poorly performing 
students during the testing window, thereby using “discipline for misbehaviour as a tool to 
bolster aggregate performance.” This action by schools could put these students in greater risk as 
Jacob and Lefgren (2003) show that children who are home from school are more likely to 
engage in criminal activity. High-stakes testing is also associated with increased grade retention. 
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In Texas Cullen and Reback (2006) find that schools actively retain or exempt those students 
that could harm the school grade, disproportionately targeting low-performing Black and 
Hispanic students. Additionally the ChiPS study by Jacob (2005) reveals that among low- 
achieving students in the bottom schools, grade retention rates increased by up to 180 percent. 
These measures enable schools to temporarily circumvent accountability systems by superficially 
meeting proficiency targets.  
Exclusion 
Reshaping the test pool temporarily displaces academically poor students in order to meet 
benchmarks of adequate performance or progress. Exclusion, however, is permanent and whilst 
it may be beneficial to the school, it poses serious consequences for a student’s potential future. 
In some instances, “it is actually to the school’s advantage to drop slow learners and borderline 
students from the school, because they are usually poor test-takers” (Figlio & Getzler, 2002, p.2). 
The structure of accountability programmes could be said to incentivise schools to exclude or 
push out weak students as dropout rates account for a fraction of the accountability index 
compared to cognitive measures (Elmore, Abelmann & Fuhrmann, 1996). A number of studies 
report this behaviour as low-scoring students are excluded from admission to “open enrolment” 
schools, encouraged to transfer to GED programs (for individuals who have left high school 
without a diploma) or asked to drop out of school altogether (Booher-Jennings, 2006; Darling-
Hammond, 1991; Haney, 2000; Heilig & Darling-Hammond, 2008). Consequently even when 
students are not forcibly asked to leave schools they may do so voluntarily as schooling is 
perceived as confusing and pointless due to the degradation of the curriculum, zero tolerance 
towards absence and increased grade retention (McNeil et al., 2008). In some cases, as in the state 
of Texas, this has resulted in real graduation rates of only 33 percent (McNeil et al., 2008). Whilst 
the exclusionary effect of accountability incentives may be negated in future with more 
sophisticated built in incentives, the damage to date is alarming and highly costly to students. 
2.4.3 Unintentional Strategic Behavior 
A broader number of unintended side effects on school systems and students arise due to 
increased accountability including but not limited to content manipulation, myopia, complacency 
and indicator or grade fixation.  
Content Manipulation 
New accountability systems may unintentionally influence the content of the education syllabus 
thereby forgoing a broader education which focusses on imparting knowledge as well as ideals, 
11 
ethics and values for a more narrow view of subject material (de Wolf & Janssens, 2007). There 
is a significant amount of growing up that is done whilst a student is at school, but not 
necessarily engaged in learning. Under the in loco parentis role of the teacher, classroom dynamics, 
teacher and peer interactions and general discussion all contribute toward imparting ethics, 
manners, culture, and life lessons to students. This broader education deteriorates under 
accountability as teachers, particularly in academically bankrupt schools, are pressured to forgo 
the personal and intrinsic aspect of teaching in order to accommodate and prepare for national 
assessments.  
Myopia 
This subtle manipulation of standards may result in myopia where schools focus on short-term 
solutions at the expense of long-term policy reform (Smith, 2002). This is evident through 
teacher and school efforts to reach accountability targets and avoid sanctions rather than 
building and entrenching sound educational practices to improve student knowledge and 
understanding. Myopia underlies all gaming behaviour as teachers and at risk schools attempt to 
meet accountability standards falsely rather than pursuing a true account of affairs which could 
highlight areas of concern and draw assistance with regards to resources, consultants and the 
implementation of effective school systems. This is particularly disconcerting as it “takes about 
three years to achieve successful change in student performance in an elementary school [and] 
about six years to do so in a secondary school,” entrenching these bad practices (Fullan, 2002, 
p.1).
Complacency or Ossification 
Accountability may also sanction complacency or ossification among well graded schools stifling 
innovation and experimentation in order to remain in the middle bracket (de Wolf & Janssens, 
2007). This is seen at the classroom level where teachers place their focus on those marginal 
students that could affect the accountability grade and neglect the development of infra-marginal 
students (those well below or above the accountability grade) (Jacob, 2005). At the managerial or 
principal level, the fruit of investment in innovation or the experimentation of new practices is 
risky and may only reflect in future outcomes. It is therefore safer to focus on tried and tested 
policies and sustain moderate targets as exceptional performance raises expectations, “and the 
manager looking for a quiet life may instead spurn the short-lived plaudits arising from a 
beneficial innovation, and opt for chronic mediocrity” (Smith, 2002, p.236.). Through 
accountability systems the incentive to solve the challenges facing the education system is 




High-stakes testing may also distort students’ perspectives on their schooling experience making 
the “quest for an education a quest for grades and, by extension, for the more intrinsic rewards 
for which grades can be exchanged” (Aiken, 1991, p.725). As most accountability systems are 
aimed towards primary and secondary schooling, an excessive emphasis on examination 
performance may foster an unhealthy outlook on academics. According to Akerlof and Kranton 
(2002, p.1167) “a student’s primary motivation is his or her identity,” and a continual focus on 
test results may begin to define a student’s perceptions of oneself. For a struggling student in a 
competitive environment this may lead to low self-esteem which is reported as one of the 
contributing features of an individual’s propensity to cheat (McCabe et al., 2001).  
2.5 Intentional Cheating and Rotten Apples 
Perhaps the worst potential outcome of school accountability programmes is that of outright 
cheating. The stress and strain of a new education programme and focus on test scores and 
grades may induce students, teachers and administrators to cheat in order to achieve the desired 
result. This is the study area of Jacob and Levitt (2003) in their paper, “Rotten Apples”. Jacob 
and Levitt explore teacher and administrator cheating, referred to as ‘teacher cheating’, in 
Chicago public schools just prior to the implementation of the No Child Left Behind Act. Whilst 
this Bill had not yet been passed, the state of Chicago was required to annually test elementary 
students, rate schools based on their performance in these tests and intervene in schools that had 
not made sufficient improvement (Jacob & Levitt, 2003). The authors use the individual question 
answers given by students in grades three through eight who took the Iowa Test of Basic Skills 
(ITBS) between the years 1993 and 2000 to estimate the prevalence of teacher cheating. Teacher 
cheating encompasses a broad range of illicit activities such as changing student responses on 
answer sheets, announcing the correct answers in the test venue, and teaching students based on 
knowledge of the questions in the test (Jacob & Levitt, 2003). This is a very new analysis of 
cheating as most previous studies focus on student copying through specific cheating events, 
retesting suspicious performance, analysing erasure patterns and error similarity analysis (Aiken, 
1991; Angoff, 1974; Bellezza & Bellezza, 1989; Holland, 1996; Wollack, 1997).  
Jacob and Levitt design a new approach that uses two types of indicators namely unexpected test 
score fluctuations and unusual patterns of answers for students within a classroom. The presence 
of teacher cheating increases unexpected test score fluctuations as these students will likely 
experience unusually large gains in test scores one year followed by very small gains and even 
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possible declines the following year when they are exposed to a different teacher. Teacher 
cheating may also leave tell-tale signs of unusual patterns such as blocks of identical answers, 
unusual patterns of correlation across student answers or unusual response patterns on a 
student’s exam. An example of such would be an academically poor student answering all the 
difficult questions towards the end of a test correctly whilst getting many of the easy answers 
incorrect. These two indicators will be very weakly correlated in classrooms which do not 
experience cheating, but highly correlated where cheating is present thus forming the underlying 
identification strategy of the paper. The authors find that cheating is prevalent in 4 to 5 percent 
of the classes in the sample with this most likely being a cautious estimate as the approach is 
shown to only partially detect illicit behaviour. In addition cheating is by nature a secretive 
endeavour and there are many other forms of cheating such as allowing students extra time that 
may not be noted by this identification. As confirmation Jacob and Levitt then run a simulation 
shuffling the students in order to demonstrate that there is nothing mechanical in their 
identification strategy that confounds the results.  
2.6 The Case for South Africa 
Based on the approach outlined by Jacob and Levitt (2003) and further work by Gustafsson 
(2014), this paper aims to discover the prevalence of cheating in the South African context. 
There are a number of reasons one would expect to discover cheating in the education system 
through the Annual National Assessments. Some of these contributing factors include 
corruption, lacking resources, and a global cheating epidemic.  
Corruption 
South Africa has a growing embedded culture of corruption and illicit behaviour which is 
especially common in public sectors. In 2014 South Africa was ranked 67th on the Corruption 
Perception Index (CPI) with a score of 44. The CPI measures perceived levels of public sector 
corruption worldwide, from 0 ‘completely corrupt’ to 100 ‘completely clean’, with a poor score 
likely reflecting “widespread bribery, lack of punishment for corruption and public institutions 
that don’t respond to citizens’ needs” (Transparency International, 2014, p.1). Fittingly the 
Auditor General, Kimi Makwetu, recently reported irregular expenditure of R25.7 billion for the 
2014-2015 year with education, health, and public works sectors accounting for 45 percent of 
these irregularities (Auditor General South Africa, 2015). The key driver of these findings is 
uncompetitive and corrupt procurement processes which were found in 31 percent of the audits 
observed (Auditor General South Africa, 2015).  
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Deeper cases of corruption have been discovered in the education sector recently through the 
“Report of the Ministerial Task Team appointed by Minister Angie Motshekga to investigate 
Allegations into the selling of posts of educators by members of Teachers Unions and 
Departmental Officials in Provincial Education Departments” (Volmink et al, 2016). The task 
team investigated 81 cases of suspected corrupt appointments and found that these point to 
“widespread practices of improper and unfair influence affecting the outcomes of the 
appointment of educators” (Volmink et al, 2016, p.16). Overall these cases suggest that there is 
corruption and collusion among all levels of officials leading to a system of nepotism (Volmink et 
al, 2016, p.16). The degree of corruption was found to vary between provinces depending on the 
balance of power between the South African Democratic Teachers Union (SADTU) and other 
Unions, and the Department of Basic Education in that province. Hence, “where Districts work 
strictly according to regulated procedures and where their managerial and administrative staff 
members are persistent and consistent in carrying out their duties in accordance with a coherent 
system, the Teacher Unions in those areas are held in check and procedures and decisions are led 
by the department” (Volmink et al, 2016, p.18). Effectively this is only the case in one-third of 
South Africa’s provinces with evident corruption in the North West Province, Eastern Cape, 
KwaZulu-Natal and Limpopo and suspected corruption in Gauteng and Mpumalanga (Volmink 
et al, 2016).  
Lacking Resources 
Furthermore, job insecurity and a lack of resources and effective monitoring leave South Africa 
unable to adequately supervise instruction and assessment. Under-qualified or unqualified 
teachers, especially in rural areas, teach ill-disciplined, overcrowded classrooms with insufficient 
resources and inadequate infrastructure (Prew, 2009). “In many instances the South African 
Government fails not only to provide facilities such as libraries and laboratory material, but also 
crucial learning materials such as books” (Modisaotsile, 2012, p.4). Under these conditions, 
teachers are incentivised to illicitly help students through their assessments so as to not reflect 
poorly on their effort. On a government level, failure of appropriate inspection and monitoring 
allows teacher and school cheating to go unnoticed, increasing the acceptability of the practise 
and further degrading the quality of education. 
Global Cheating      
In addition to the culture of corruption ever growing in South Africa and the lack of resources, 
cheating among school and university students seems to have become a global phenomenon. 
The USA is currently struggling through a cheating ‘crisis’ at schools with 51 percent of students 
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having admitted to cheating on at least one exam in a 2012 survey of 23 000 high school students 
run by the Josephson Institute for Ethics (Josephson Institute, 2012). Further evidence of this 
behaviour is reported in work by McCabe et al. (2001), Galloway (2012), Nichols et al. (2007) and 
many others. This epidemic is not limited to the USA with similar experiences around the globe 
as students from varying countries such as Brazil, Thailand, Denmark, New Zealand, Argentina 
and Singapore, to name a few, believe that the “cheating culture [is] here” (Crittenden et al, 2009, 
p.337). “Cheating has [therefore] become a pervasive problem in high school and college
classrooms, and schools face a culture where the behaviour has become a normalised, accepted 
mechanism for gaining advantage” (Galloway, 2012, p.379).  
South Africa is not immune to these issues with a hearing recently being held on incidents of 
mass cheating in the 2014 matric examinations. Education spokesperson Elijah Mhlanga states 
that “more than 5 300 candidates from all provinces are currently being investigated for various 
alleged irregularities, including mass copying arising from the 2014 Grade 12 final examinations” 
(Mhlanga, 2015). Cheating seems to be highly prevalent in KwaZulu-Natal and the Eastern Cape 
with 39 and 19 exam centres respectively being investigated on these counts (Mhlanga, 2015). In 
this context, an investigation into the prevalence of cheating in South African schools is certainly 
relevant with initial results suggesting a substantial number of particularly high levels of ‘strange 
patterns’ in the ANA data. 
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Chapter 3: The Data 
3.1 Introduction to the ANA Data 
This paper uses data from just over 800 public schools reflecting performance at the item level in 
the 2013 Verification Annual National Assessments carried out in South Africa. The ANA were 
introduced in 2011 and have been affirmed by government as a “significant learner achievement 
indicator of educational quality in the South African schooling system” (Department of Basic 
Education, 2013, p.1). The ANA were initiated in South Africa to reveal and address national 
educational realities within the historical and socio-economic contexts of the country. Prior to 
the ANA, the Matric examination was the only standardised method of evaluating the education 
system. The story outlined by the matric results, however, is not particularly informative given 
that “of 100 pupils that start school, only 50 will make it to grade 12, 40 will pass, and only 12 
will qualify for university” (Spaull, 2013, p.3). As such, the ANA focus on assessing Mathematics 
and Language competencies in grades one to six and grade nine across all public schools, 
including special schools and state-funded independent primary schools, in the country. This 
allows for more rigorous monitoring and is intended to highlight those problems that hide lower 
down in the educational system. 
In the 2013 phase almost seven million learners from more than 24 000 schools participated in 
these assessments (Department of Basic Education, 2013). Whilst the ANA are not attached to 
any consequences based on school performance, the Department of Basic Education (DBE) has 
high hopes for the programme stating that the “key outputs are to ensure high quality of 
teaching and learning, improved literacy and numeracy at schools, better National Senior 
Certificate examination performance as well as expanding early childhood development” (2013, 
p.1). The ANA programme is young, vast and has expanded quickly leading to questions of the
reliability and validity of the data. As such the assessments of a representative sample of schools 
at the key stages of grades 3, 6 and 9 were conducted, monitored, marked, captured and 
processed by independent service providers, Deloitte and Nexia SAB&T. The data from this 
sample is called Verification ANA (V-ANA) and was used to confirm the reliability of the data 
emanating from the universal test results (Department of Basic Education, 2013). Of the 24 000 
schools that participated in 2013, 2 164 schools were selected for the verification process. 
Designing, implementing and capturing assessments at this level is time consuming and costly 
and it is therefore important that the data be accurate and useable. 
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3.2 Completeness of the Data 
The 2013 service providers intended to capture item-level data from around 45 schools per 
province, grade and subject; representing a subsample of the Verification ANA data. As evident 
in Table 1 below, this was generally achieved with the exception of grade 6 and 9 Home 
Language. A few schools in the data were excluded due to problems experienced when merging 
datasets in order to attain total school enrolment, resulting in an accurate representation of the 
V-ANA schools in this analysis. Overall the completeness of the data is good with close to the 
targeted number of schools per province, grade and subject having the required data. In addition 
there were almost no item-level responses missing across all grades, allowing for a complete 
analysis of strange patterns at the item-level.  
The Universal ANA dataset, however, reports a number of data complications, the largest 
problem being that “around 15% of learners who should be reflected in the data are not” 
(Vilakazi & Gustafsson, 2014, p.1). The level of incompleteness varies drastically across districts 
and duplicate learners seem to remain even after duplicate records in terms of the ‘unique’ 
learner identifier have been removed. In addition, the master list of schools held by the DBE 
confirmed that the universal ANA dataset misreported 100 schools as public schools when they 
are in fact independent (Vilakazi & Gustafsson, 2014, p.1). These anomalies potentially show the 
introduction of gaming behaviour and detail the data integrity issues that need to be focussed on 
in future. These issues validate the use of the Verification-ANA data in this analysis.   
The following table reflects the national statistics relating to the size and shape of the item-level 
V-ANA data under review. The structure and number of the items or questions asked varies 
across grade and subject.  













Details on items not 
0-1 (e.g. 11:2 means 
11 items had a 0-1-2 
response structure) 
Grade 3 Mathematics 392 43,6 24.0 34 6 6:2 
Grade 3 Home Language 396 44,0 24.1 27 9 8:2, 1:6 
Grade 6 Mathematics 387 43,0 23.6 50 18 11:2, 5:3, 1:4 
Grade 6 Home Language 134 14,9 22.8 50 9 5:2, 3:3, 1:15 
Grade 9 Mathematics 394 43,8 25.1 62 38 17:2, 7:3, 9:4, 5:5 
Grade 9 Home Language 108 12,0 24.5 39 17 14:2, 1:5, 1:10, 1:20 




3.3 Values on Class within Grade 
Due to the mechanisms employed by Jacob and Levitt, it is useful to know which students in the 
same grade are also in the same class. This information is important as teachers are likely to only 
have influence over their class and students are likely to only be able to copy off those sitting in 
the same classroom. The 2013 ANA data does include class information but inconsistencies in 
the way this was reported and captured has led to a third of the schools not having this 
information available. In preliminary work by Gustafsson (2014), analysis was conducted using 
two different methods in order to gauge the effect this variable has on the results. In one 
approach, class data was used where it seemed trustworthy and in the other class data was 
ignored altogether, as if all learners in the same grade were in the same class. The two methods 
produced very similar indicator values suggesting that the class data problem does not have 
much bearing on the results. This paper will henceforth discard class information but in future, 




Chapter 4: Methodology 
 
4.1 The Construction of Cheating Indicators 
There are a few distinctions to take into account when applying Jacob and Levitt’s cheating 
indicators to the South African ANA data.  With the Iowa Test of Basic Skills (ITBS) data, Jacob 
and Levitt are able to follow the same students through their grades over a three year period. 
This contributes towards the certainty of their findings and allows for comparisons across years. 
The V-ANA data in this analysis offers more of a snapshot of the educational system at one 
point in time. Whilst these assessments have been carried out each year, no effort has been made 
to ensure repeated sampling of the same students or psychometrically-comparable test 
instruments. The design of the V-ANA data therefore leads to a lack of comparability across 
years and restricts the application of the Jacob and Levitt measures. 
A further distinction concerns the differing format of the annual tests between the two 
programmes. The ITBS is a multiple-choice assessment where students can answer “A,” “B,” 
“C” or “D.” Jacob and Levitt’s analysis is therefore concerned with the specific responses 
students choose, and the unusualness or suspiciousness of those answers given a host of 
background characteristics. The ANA comprise varying forms of questions, not limited to 
multiple-choice. The marks allocated to questions differ according to difficulty and structure. In 
addition, the data reflects only the individual score obtained by the student per item. The focus 
of this analysis is therefore whether a student got a specific item right or wrong as opposed to 
whether they chose a particular answer. Some of the marks allocated to questions did not follow 
a simple 0-1 structure, as can be seen in Table 1, and were reconstructed to conform to this 
format. In these cases the raw score was rounded down to “0” or up to “1” depending on the 
percentage achieved. As an example; a score of 1 out of 5 would be rounded down to “0”, whilst 
a score of 3 out of 4 would be rounded up to “1”. 
4.1.1 Indicator 1 (Unexpected Test Score Fluctuations) 
Jacob and Levitt use the Iowa Test of Basic Skills data from Chicago public schools which tracks 
the same students over time through the grades from 1993 to 2000. As such their first indicator 
of cheating compares average classroom test gains for each classroom relative to all other 
classrooms in the same subject, grade and year. Test gains of specific classes can then be 
monitored across years in order to detect cheating. A classroom with a cheating teacher will 
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experience unusually large gains in test scores in the current year followed by much smaller gains 
the following year under a new teacher. These large fluctuations in student test scores over 
grades indicate that teacher cheating has occurred. As the ANA data does not track the same 
students each year, this indicator cannot be replicated. 
4.1.2 Indicator 2 (Suspicious Answer Strings) 
Measure 1: Suspicious Item Patterns over Time 
Measure 1 looks at unusual identical blocks of item-level responses within a classroom. These 
answer patterns arise from the most basic form of teacher cheating, the correction of 
consecutive student responses following conclusion of the assessment. Using a multinomial logit 
model Jacob and Levitt predict the probability that each student chooses each possible answer 
for each question given the likelihood that similar students, based on background characteristics, 
will choose that particular response. The authors then consider all students and consecutive 
answers to find unusual blocks of item-level responses that are least likely to have arisen by 
chance. The more unlikely the unusual block of responses, the greater the probability that 
cheating has occurred. As Jacob and Levitt (2003, p.851) describe; 
“Thus if ten very bright students in a class of thirty give the correct answers to the first 
five questions on the exam (typically the easier questions), the block of identical answers 
will not appear unusual. In contrast, if all fifteen students in a low-achieving classroom 
give the same correct answers to the last five questions on the exam (typically the harder 
questions), this would appear quite suspect.”    
This measure, however, is not appropriate given the structure of the V-ANA data. As per Table 
1, the V-ANA sample consists of approximately 24 students per school from roughly 45 schools 
per province. These students are sampled across the grade leaving very few observations per 
teacher with ill-reported class or academic achievement values. This differs drastically from the 
data used by Jacob and Levitt (2003) where the average school caters to 722 students of which 
88 percent are tested and included in official reporting. This allows for an average of 127 student 
observations per grade, a sample approximately 5 times larger than that reflected in the V-ANA 
data. The per-grade sample size in the V-ANA data therefore makes suspicious “blocks” of 
responses highly unlikely.  
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Measure 2: Suspicious Blocks of Item Responses  
This is the first measure that seems feasible given the ANA data.   
“The second measure of suspicious answer strings involves the overall degree of 
correlation in student answers across the test. When a teacher changes answers on test 
forms, it presumably increases the uniformity of student test forms across students in the 
class” (Jacob & Levitt, 2003, p.851).    
This measure captures more subtle versions of teacher cheating. As an example a teacher might 
correct different answers on different student’s tests or provide students with help or hints when 
asked. This form of cheating then does not create unusual blocks of item answers but will affect 
the distribution of student test scores and reflect a more homogenous class in terms of 
responses. 
There are two outcomes of a student’s response; correct “1” or incorrect “0”. As such the 
following logit model is estimated to find the probability of a student’s binary response given the 
responses of other students tested within the same school:  
Pr(𝑌𝑖𝑙𝑠 = 1) =  
𝑒𝛽𝑥𝑙
1 +  𝑒𝛽𝑥𝑙
 
where 𝑌𝑖𝑙𝑠 indicates the response of learner 𝑙 on item 𝑖 in school 𝑠. The estimated coefficients are 
reported as log-odds and need to be converted into predicted probabilities in order to gain a 
meaningful interpretation of the results.   
The predicted probability is calculated as: 
𝑝𝑖𝑙𝑠 =  
𝑒?̂?𝑥𝑙
1 + 𝑒?̂?𝑥𝑙
 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑢𝑎𝑙 𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑝𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑒 𝑔𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑛 𝑏𝑦 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑠𝑡𝑢𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡. 
The residuals are then calculated for each choice the students could have made on each item: 
𝑒𝑖𝑙𝑠 = 0 −  
𝑒?̂?𝑥𝑙
1 + 𝑒?̂?𝑥𝑙
 𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑛 𝑠𝑡𝑢𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠 𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑝𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑒 𝑖𝑠 "0" 
                                           = 1 −  
𝑒?̂?𝑥𝑙
1 + 𝑒?̂?𝑥𝑙
 𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑛 𝑠𝑡𝑢𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠 𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑝𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑒 𝑖𝑠 "1" 
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Two residuals are calculated per learner. In order to achieve a school level measure of the 
response to each item, the residuals for each response are summed across students within the 
same school: 
𝑒𝑖𝑠 =  ∑ 𝑒𝑖𝑙𝑠
𝑙
 
The summed residuals are then squared and divided by the number of tested students within the 
school in order to accentuate outliers and normalise by school size. 





This statistic is analogous to the variance of student responses on each item within each school. 
M2, the second measure of suspicious strings is then just the school average of this variance 
statistic across all test items: 
𝑀2𝑠 =  ?̅?𝑠 =  
∑ 𝑣𝑖𝑠𝑖
𝑛𝑖
 𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒 𝑛𝑖 𝑖𝑠 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑖𝑡𝑒𝑚𝑠 𝑜𝑛 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑒𝑥𝑎𝑚. 
This measure uses the overall degree of correlation in student answers across the test within a 
given school. A cheating school will therefore have a narrower band of student responses, a 
higher degree of correlation in student responses and will have a higher M2 value than a school 
that does not engage in cheating.  
Measure 3: Suspicious within class variance (i.e. high variance in cross-
question correlation of student responses)  
The “third indicator of potential cheating is a high variance in the degree of correlation 
across questions” (Jacob & Levitt, 2003, p.851).  
This measure uses the variance in the degree of correlation across questions as an indicator of 
cheating behaviour. If teachers correct student responses on certain questions or help students 
with specific questions then the within-school correlation on these questions will be particularly 
high. The correlation on other questions, which students answered independently, will however 
be typical. This leads to larger cross-question variances in student correlations in cheating 





This measure is then calculated as: 
𝑀3𝑠 =  𝜎𝑣𝑠
2 =  
∑ (𝑣𝑖𝑠 − ?̅?𝑠)²𝑖
𝑛𝑖
 
A school with a high variance in cross-question correlation will have a high M3 value and will be 
suspected of cheating.  
Measure 4: Implausible school-level item averages relative to other 
academically comparable schools  
The final measure, measure 4, 
“compares the answers that students in one [school] give compared with the answers of 
other students in the system who take the identical test and get the exact same score” 
(Jacob & Levitt, 2003, p.852). 
This measure looks at the distribution of a student’s responses within a school in comparison 
with the distribution of all other students’ responses who achieved the same aggregate score on 
the ANA. This essentially enables an assessment of where the students get their marks.  
In calculating this measure let; 
𝑞𝑖𝑙𝑠 = 1 𝑖𝑓 𝑙𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑒𝑟 𝑙 𝑖𝑛 𝑠𝑐ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑙 𝑠 𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑤𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑑 𝑖𝑡𝑒𝑚 𝑖 𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑙𝑦 
                               = 0 𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒 
               𝐴𝑙 = 𝑎𝑔𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑔𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑙𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑒𝑟 𝑙 𝑜𝑛 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝐴𝑁𝐴 
                        𝑛𝑙𝐴 = 𝑛𝑜. 𝑜𝑓 𝑙𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑠 𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ 𝑎𝑛 𝑎𝑔𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑔𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝐴  
The fraction of students answering each item correctly at each aggregate score level can then be 
defined as: 
?̅?𝑖




The difference in student response patterns across all other students with the same aggregate 
score can then be calculated as: 







The school level deviation in student responses across aggregates is then calculated as: 
𝑀4𝑠 =  ∑ (𝑍𝑙𝑠
𝑙
−  ?̅?𝐴) 
This measure then determines how suspicious, at the school level, the aggregate score of a 
student is given their response pattern and the deviation from the average response pattern given 
by all other students with the same aggregate score.  
A composite measure, JL3, is then constructed as: 
𝐽𝐿3𝑠𝑏 = (𝑝𝑐𝑡_𝑀2𝑠,𝑏)
2
+ (𝑝𝑐𝑡_𝑀3𝑠,𝑏)² + (𝑝𝑐𝑡_𝑀4𝑠,𝑏)², 
where pct_M2 refers to the percentile of the M2 value for a specific school, to give an overall 
measure of the suspiciousness of school level answer strings in each subject.  
4.2 Identification Strategy and Assumptions 
Ideally, one would like to observe the suspicious measure values for guaranteed non-cheating 
schools and compare these to all other schools in the data to find an estimate of the prevalence 
of cheating. However, in the absence of an appropriate counterfactual, three assumptions help 
identify which schools are engaged in cheating behaviour.  
1. Cheating increases the likelihood of suspicious response strings and therefore gives high 
values of these measures; M2, M3 and M4. 
2. A high degree of correlation between the three cheating measures suggests that a school 
with a high composite measure, JL3, is a cheater school. 
3. If cheating classrooms had not cheated they would look like non-cheating classrooms; 
they would have a relatively constant degree of cheating indicators and these measures 
would be closer to or equal to 0. 
Assumption 1 holds due to the manner in which the cheating measures have been constructed as 
seen in Jacob and Levitt (2003). Accordingly, cheating classrooms will be concentrated in the 
upper end or tail of the distribution of suspicious answer strings.  
This in turn should be confirmed by a higher JL3 measure, under assumption 2. The table below 
displays correlation matrices for Grade 3 and 6 in Mathematics and Language. As can be seen, 
the correlations between the different cheating measures are all positive resulting in high JL3 
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scores for “cheater” schools. The other flatter sections of the distribution which are associated 
with much lower suspicious answer scores should therefore include very few cheaters.  
Table 2: Correlation Matrices of Cheating Measures 
Grade 3 Mathematics 
   
Grade 6 Mathematics 
 
  
 M2 M3 M4 JL3 Score  M2 M3 M4 JL3 Score 
M2 1.00 
    
M2 1.00 
    
M3 0.83 1.00 
   
M3 0.88 1.00 
   
M4 0.43 0.34 1.00 
  
M4 0.47 0.35 1.00 
  
JL3 0.47 0.38 0.49 1.00 
 
JL3 0.38 0.22 0.70 1.00 
 
Score 0.12 0.14 0.03 0.08 1.00 Score 0.30 0.16 0.12 0.25 1.00 
            
Grade 3 Home Language Grade 6 First Additional Language 
 M2 M3 M4 JL3 Score  M2 M3 M4 JL3 Score 
M2 1.00 
    
M2 1.00 
    
M3 0.78 1.00 
   
M3 0.77 1.00 
   
M4 0.26 0.27 1.00 
  
M4 0.38 0.36 1.00 
  
JL3 0.42 0.35 0.29 1.00 
 
JL3 0.36 0.28 0.39 1.00 
 
Score  0.43 0.26 0.11 0.20 1.00 Score 0.34 0.27 0.27 0.15 1.00 
Source: V-ANA (2013) 
 
Following assumption 3, schools in the lower and flatter section of the suspicious strings 
distributions can form the non-cheating counterfactual needed for analysis. The nature of this 
counterfactual is that it is situated in the bottom and middle range of the distribution. For 
analysis, however, this counterfactual is needed, but not observed, in the upper tail of the 
distribution where cheating occurs. Assuming assumption 3 holds, the observed counterfactual 
in the bottom and middle range of the distribution can be projected to the upper tail of the 
distribution to predict what it would have looked like in the absence of cheating. The distance 
between the predicted and observed distributions of suspicious answer strings then allows for an 
estimate of cheating to be calculated.   
As an example, the following graphs show the percentile plots of the different and composite 
cheating measures for the Grade 3 V-ANA Mathematics assessment data. These graphs reflect 
the mean cheating scores and the associated percentage of schools who achieve that score. As 
seen below, the scores of the cheating measures increase rapidly towards the upper end of the 
distributions, particularly past the 85th and 90th percentiles. This indicates that cheating most 
likely is apparent in the schools past these points. In order to reduce the probability of labelling a 
non-cheating school in reality a “cheater” school in the analysis, the 90th percentile will be used 
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as a cautious cut-off point for suspicious measures in order to help quantify the extent of 
cheating in the ANA.  
 
Source: V-ANA (2013) 
4.3 Cheating Measures and Overall Levels of Performance 
In order to ascertain that high measure values are driven by suspicious behaviour such as 
cheating, one needs to rule out all other possibilities. In this sense, it may be necessary to 
ascertain whether high measure values, especially M2 and M3, in certain provinces are driven by 
lower average school scores in these provinces due to the increased likelihood of blocks of 
incorrect answers and high cross-question variation. Under this hypothesis, schools with lower 
average school scores across all provinces would display higher M2 and M3 values compared to 
schools with higher average school scores. As seen in the previous correlation matrices, this 
hypothesis does not seem to hold according to the V-ANA data as is expected due to the 
manner in which the cheating measures were constructed. The correlation matrices show that 
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Figure 1: An Example of V-ANA Cheating Measures Percentile Plots
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with lower scoring schools. In fact all correlation coefficients between all cheating measures and 
overall academic performance are positive indicating that on average, those schools with higher 
scores are the ones with the most suspicious data, high cheating measure values. 
Overall, across all provinces, Grade 3 schools with suspicious data display better scores on 
average than schools with clean data. To illustrate the extent of this relationship, the average 
number of items correct for the 12 suspicious schools in the Mathematics assessment was 20.11 
(these are schools with ‘1’ scores for all four cheating measures) compared to an average score of 
16.20 for the 288 clean or ‘0000’ schools. The same pattern is observed in the Home Language 
assessment, the average number of items correct for the 8 suspicious schools was 15.46 (these 
are schools with ‘1’ scores for all four cheating measures) compared to an average score of 10.69 
for the 298 clean or ‘0000’ schools.  
The same relationship is observed with respect to Grade 6 schools whereby those with 
suspiciously high cheating indicator values on average perform better than those schools with 
lower suspicious string values. In the Mathematics assessment the average number of items 
correct for the 16 schools with excessively high suspicious measure values is 22.9 compared to 
an average score of 16.08 for the 294 clean schools. Similarly with respect to the assessment on 
First Additional Language on average the 7 “cheater” schools answered 25 items correctly 
compared to clean schools which achieved an overall score of 20.41 for the 210 clean schools. 
This gives an indication of the direction of causality: it would seem that on average schools that 
engage in suspicious or cheating behaviour display better overall scores, although in many cases 




Chapter 5: Data Analysis and Findings  
 
5.1 Summary Statistics: V-ANA Academic Performance 
The following table shows the V-ANA average achievement level and pass rate for Grades 3, 6 
and 9 in Mathematics and Home Language. Grade 3 Language and Mathematics is tested in all 
11 official South African languages whilst Grade 6 and Grade 9 Language and Numeracy are 
written in English or Afrikaans. These figures corroborate the findings in the DBE’s Report on 
the ANA of 2013. The DBE states that, “while the ANA results of 2013 point to an upward 
trend in most grades, we still have to strengthen our efforts towards realising the desired 60% 
threshold of learners mastering the minimum Language and Mathematics competencies by the 
end of Grades 3, 6 and 9” (Department of Basic Education, 2013, p.1).  
 
Table 3: Summary Statistics on the Academic Performance of V-ANA Schools 






Grade 3 Mathematics 16.39 7.74 34 4620 49.03 
Grade 3 Home Language 11.48 6.11 27 3634 38.00 
Grade 6 Mathematics 16.62 10.49 50 1946 21.00 
Grade 6 Home Language 32.11 10.87 50 2398 78.00 
Grade 9 Mathematics 7.94 7.00 62 193 2.00 
Grade 9 Home Language 18.75 7.26 39 1078 47.93 
Source: V-ANA 2013 
 
Generally the average attainment level for Language is higher and more consistent than that for 
Mathematics. This pattern continues when looking at pass rates, the percentage of students who 
attained more than 50 percent. Mathematics pass rates drop drastically between grades starting 
from a pass rate of almost 50 percent in grade 3 and culminating in a 2 percent pass rate in grade 
9. This makes estimation for grade 9 mathematics particularly worrying due to the lack of 
variation in the data. Language pass rates remain more stable over grades with a great 
improvement between grade 3 and 6 up to a pass rate of 78 percent. Language pass rates do 
drop in grade 9 but not to the extent of Mathematics. Overall, the ANA results for grades 3 and 




5.2 Detailed Analysis of Grade 3    
This section investigates and discusses the prevalence of cheating with respect to the Grade 3 V-
ANA data. Results for both Mathematics and Home Language are reported and compared. Both 
Language and Mathematics assessments are conducted in all 11 official South African languages. 
Both the Language and Mathematics assessments vary in difficulty ranging from simple one 
mark answers or multiple choice questions to more difficult comprehensive or computational 
questions.  
5.2.1 Summary Statistics for ANA Cheating Measures 
 
The following table shows the summary statistics of cheating measures for Grade 3 Mathematics 
and Home Language. For Mathematics and Home Language 392 and 396 schools are discussed 
respectively. Schools presenting any cheating measure value above the 90th percentile were 
deemed to reflect high levels of suspicious responses and were labelled “cheater” or “noted” 
schools. Most of the cheating indicators reported below are lower for Home Language than for 
Mathematics suggesting that cheating occurs to a greater degree in higher-stakes subjects like 
Mathematics.  
 
Table 4: Summary Statistics on Cheating Measures for Grade 3 
Assessment Mean SD Min 10th % Median 90th % Max 
Noted 
Schools 
Mathematics Grade 3                 
M2 ANA  0.44 0.20 0.13 0.25 0.41 0.62 1.64 58 
M3 ANA  0.84 1.25 0.02 0.14 0.50 1.60 15.48 54 
M4 ANA  -0.20 10.96 -30.01 -12.68 -0.85 12.17 54.11 43 
Home Language Grade 3                 
M2 ANA  0.45 0.19 0.03 0.25 0.42 0.69 1.36 67 
M3 ANA  0.59 0.72 0.01 0.11 0.37 1.37 10.16 33 
M4 ANA  -0.05 8.15 -23.20 -9.91 -0.73 10.42 29.32 27 
Source: V-ANA (2013) 
 
M2 values are almost identical between Mathematics and Home Language while M3 and M4 
values begin to differ. The average M3 value for Mathematics is 0.84 compared to an average M3 
value for Home Language of 0.59. M4 values diverge further with mathematics M4 values on 
average 1.35 times the magnitude of those for Home Language. The M4 measure gives an overall 
measure of the implausibility of a school’s responses. Restricting the analysis to consider only 
this measure, just over 11 percent of schools display suspicious answer strings in Mathematics 
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compared to almost 10 percent for Home Language. Suspicious response patterns are therefore 
prevalent in both subjects; however, the suspicious measure values and 90th percentile cut-off 
points are lower for Home Language suggesting that cheating behaviour may be more obvious in 
higher stakes subjects like Mathematics which is consistent with international literature on high 
stakes testing.  
The following table shows combinations of high measure values for Grade 3 Mathematics and 
Home Language. Schools exceeding the 90th percentile values for the individual cheating 
measures, or composite measure, were considered to have high measure values and were 
assigned a value of “1”. This table acts as a cursory check and provides a more conservative 
estimate of the prevalence of cheating in the ANA data. If one assumes that only those schools 
exhibiting high measure values across all cheating measures are engaged in suspicious behaviour 
then only 3.06 percent and 2.02 percent of schools can be labelled as “cheater schools” in 
Mathematics and Home Language respectively (using the 90th percentile threshold).   
 
Table 5: Combinations of High Value Cheating Measures for Grade 3 
Suspicious Answer String Measures Noted Schools 
M2 M3 M4 JL3 Mathematics       (%)  Home   
Language 
 (%) 
0 0 0 0 288 73.47 298  75.25 
0 0 1 0 8 2.04 11  2.78 
1 1 0 1 1 0.26 0  0 
1 1 1 1 12 3.06 8  2.02 
0 1 0 0 12 3.06 14  3.54 
1 0 0 0 9 2.3 12  3.03 
1 1 0 0 24 6.12 19  4.80 
0 0 1 1 11 2.81 13  3.29 
Other less frequent combinations 27 6.89 21  5.30 
Total Schools     392  396   
Source: V-ANA (2013) 
 
Using M4 values and high measure values across all cheating measures provides a conservative or 
lower bound estimate of the prevalence of cheating in the V-ANA data. According to these 
constructs, cheating occurs in between 3 percent and 11 percent of schools for Mathematics and 
2 percent and 10 percent for Home Language in Grade 3. These estimates may in fact be greater 
considering the large standard deviations associated especially with the M4 measure. It is difficult 
to believe that suspicious or cheating behaviour may be organised by Grade 3 students which 
may point to the pressure teachers feel when they believe they are being scrutinised or rated. 
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These summary statistics indicate that even in lower primary schooling, teachers perceive the 
Annual National Assessments to be a reflection of their effort and respond as if the assessments 
involve high stakes.  
5.2.2 Analysis of Cheating Measures by Province 
The national perspective previously discussed gives an idea of the extent of cheating in South 
Africa within the ANA in Grade 3. It may also be interesting, however, to analyse the extent of 
strange patterns by province as provincial departments play a large role in determining the types 
of controls and monitoring that occur during testing. This will highlight those provinces that 
where cheating is more prevalent and require additional intervention or support to address these 
issues. Local policy of these provinces can then implement new structures to prevent or mitigate 
the spread of cheating in education. This is particularly important as, at the Grade 3 level, “6 of 
the 9 provinces have a failure rate of over 50 percent” (Deloitte & Nexia SAB&T, 2014, p.5). 
The following series of tables reflect the extent of suspicious behaviour by province for the 
Grade 3 Mathematics and Home Language assessments. Table 6 shows the actual 90th percentile 
values of the cheating measures by province. A cursory glance at the data reveals that suspicious 
behaviour seem to be a problem specifically in the Eastern Cape but also in KwaZulu-Natal and 
Mpumalanga in Mathematics specifically and to a lesser extent in the Free State and KwaZulu-
Natal in Home Language.  
 
Table 6: 90th Percentile Cheating Measure Values by Province for Grade 3 
 




M2 M3 M4 N M2 M3 M4 N
EC 0,79 3,49 32,12 41 0,78 1,48 5,49 42
FS 0,59 1,24 11,16 41 0,79 1,64 12,32 45
GP 0,59 1,42 9,23 53 0,59 1,12 9,29 55
KZN 0,8 3,19 25,29 42 0,9 2,12 15,26 41
LP 0,77 2,08 13,13 42 0,6 0,75 8,92 40
MP 0,67 1,95 16,76 40 0,65 1,18 9,91 42
NC 0,5 0,83 10,05 44 0,58 0,89 8,72 44
NW 0,61 1,48 13,16 45 0,72 0,71 8,78 43
WC 0,53 0,9 3,52 44 0,66 1,15 10,41 44
National 90th 
Percentile
0,62 1,6 12,21 392 0,69 1,37 10,42 396
Mathematics Home Language
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Within Mathematics; the Eastern Cape, KwaZulu-Natal and Mpumalanga have exceptionally 
high values, particularly M4 values. The average Eastern Cape and KwaZulu-Natal values are 
double those of the national 90th percentile for M3 and M4 values, indicating an excessive 
amount of strange response patterns which points to suspicious behaviour. Mpumalanga’s 
suspicious values do exceed the national 90th percentile values for Mathematics, but only 
marginally. With respect to Home Language, only KwaZulu-Natal and the Free State display 
particularly high values. These provinces exceed the national 90th percentile values across all 
suspicious string indicators.  
The 90th percentile values reported above have been used to present tables 7 to 10, which show 
these results in a more accessible manner. Tables 7 and 8 present the number and percent of 
schools which achieved cheating measure values above the national 90th percentiles respectively 
whilst tables 9 and 10 report the number and percent of these noted schools with cheating 
measure values at least two standard deviations above the national 90th percentile values 
respectively, by province. These tables reiterate that the Eastern Cape and KwaZulu-Natal are 
the most suspicious in the Mathematics assessment whilst the Free State and KwaZulu-Natal 
show suspicious behaviour in the Home Language assessment.  
With respect to Mathematics, the Eastern Cape and KwaZulu-Natal show a high number of 
noted schools in each cheating measure. This is further confirmed in table 10 where 5 percent 
and 2 percent of schools in these provinces respectively have cheating measures greater than two 
standard deviations above the national 90th percentiles. Over all the suspicious response 
measures, the Eastern Cape reports 6 noted schools (14.6 percent) whilst KwaZulu-Natal shows 
4 noted schools (9.5 percent). Suspicious blocks of item responses (M2) are the most common 
form of strange response pattern in the Eastern Cape whilst high cross-question variance (M3) is 
most common in KwaZulu-Natal schools.  
Suspicious behaviour does not seem to be as pronounced in the Home Language assessment. 
Whilst the data shows at least one noted school per cheating measure within each province, 
when looking at noted schools across all measures only the Free State and KwaZulu-Natal stand 
out. Both provinces report 3 noted schools (approximately 7 percent), however these provinces 
show different patterns of suspicious behaviour. The Free State reports strange response 
patterns compared to similar schools (M4) whilst KwaZulu-Natal shows suspicious blocks of 
item responses (M2). Whilst approximately 7 percent of schools in the Free State and KwaZulu-
Natal show overall levels of suspicious behaviour, there are no schools with cheating measure 
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values two standard deviations above the national 90th percentiles. This reflects the fact that 
suspicious behaviour is more prominent in high-stake subjects.  
Table 7: Number of Noted Schools by Province for Grade 3 
Source: V-ANA (2013) 
 
Table 8: Percent of Noted Schools by Province for Grade 3 




M2 M3 M4 All N M2 M3 M4 All N
EC 15 13 10 6 41 8 6 1 0 42
FS 3 2 4 1 41 6 7 8 3 45
GP 0 0 0 0 53 3 8 4 0 55
KZN 10 11 8 4 42 11 9 8 3 41
LP 10 10 6 1 42 3 2 5 1 40
MP 6 6 6 1 40 5 4 4 1 42
NC 2 1 0 0 44 1 3 3 1 44
NW 7 6 6 3 45 5 3 2 0 43
WC 1 1 0 0 44 3 3 4 0 44
Total 54 50 40 16 392 45 45 39 9 396
M2 0.62 M2 0.69
M3 1.60 M3 1.37
M4 12.21 M4 10.42
Mathematics Home Language
National 90th Percentile Cut-offs Applicable:
Province
M2 M3 M4 All N M2 M3 M4 All N
EC 37 32 24 15 41 19 14 2 0 42
FS 7 5 10 2 41 13 16 18 7 45
GP 0 0 0 0 53 5 15 7 0 55
KZN 24 26 19 10 42 27 22 20 7 41
LP 24 24 14 2 42 8 5 13 3 40
MP 15 15 15 3 40 12 10 10 2 42
NC 5 2 0 0 44 2 7 7 2 44
NW 16 13 13 7 45 12 7 5 0 43
WC 2 2 0 0 44 7 7 9 0 44
M2 0.62 M2 0.69
M3 1.60 M3 1.37
M4 12.21 M4 10.42
Home Language




Table 9: Number of Schools at least 2 Standard Deviations above the National 90th Percentile for 
Grade 3 
Source: V-ANA (2013) 
 
 
Table 10: Percent of Schools at least 2 Standard Deviations above the National 90th Percentile for 
Grade 3 
Source: V-ANA (2013) 
 
The above tables display sharp contrasts between those provinces that do display strange 
response patterns which hint at cheating and those that don’t. In general, suspicious measures 
are noticeably higher for Mathematics than for Home Language which corroborates international 
Province
M2 M3 M4 All N M2 M3 M4 All N
EC 3 4 2 2 41 1 2 0 0 42
FS 1 0 0 0 41 0 1 1 0 45
GP 0 1 0 0 53 0 1 0 0 55
KZN 2 1 3 1 42 3 2 1 0 41
LP 2 3 2 0 42 1 1 0 0 40
MP 1 1 0 0 40 0 0 0 0 42
NC 1 1 0 0 44 1 1 0 0 44
NW 3 2 0 0 45 0 0 0 0 43
WC 0 0 0 0 44 0 2 0 0 44
Total 13 13 7 3 392 6 10 2 0 396
M2 1.03 M2 1.07
M3 4.11 M3 2.82




M2 M3 M4 All N M2 M3 M4 All N
EC 7 10 5 5 41 2 5 0 0 42
FS 2 0 0 0 41 0 2 2 0 45
GP 0 2 0 0 53 0 2 0 0 55
KZN 5 2 7 2 42 7 5 2 0 41
LP 5 7 5 0 42 3 3 0 0 40
MP 3 3 0 0 40 0 0 0 0 42
NC 2 2 0 0 44 2 2 0 0 44
NW 7 4 0 0 45 0 0 0 0 43
WC 0 0 0 0 44 0 5 0 0 44
M2 1.03 M2 1.07
M3 4.11 M3 2.82





literature. Within Mathematics; the Eastern Cape and KwaZulu-Natal are the provinces showing 
the most pronounced suspicious behaviour with 14.6 percent and 9.5 percent of schools 
exceeding the national 90th percentiles across all measures respectively. With respect to Home 
Language, the Free State and KwaZulu-Natal report suspicious behaviour however not to the 
extent of that seen in the Mathematics assessment, approximately 7 percent of schools. The 
manner in which schools behave suspiciously varies significantly by province, subject and 
measure. More than a third of schools (37%) in the Eastern Cape and about a quarter (24%) of 
schools in schools Limpopo and KwaZulu-Natal have suspiciously high M2 and M3 values for 
the grade 3 Mathematics assessment compared to 2 percent in the Western Cape and 0 percent 
in Gauteng. 
5.2.3 Patterns within Individual Schools 
This paper has referred to the suspicious patterns of schools and thus far has discussed only the 
suspicious measure values associated with these schools. This section will explore individual 
suspicious schools and compare these to the average patterns displayed by similar clean schools. 
In this instance similar clean schools refer to those unsuspicious schools which on average 
achieved the same overall score on the assessment as the suspicious school in question. 
Comparing the patterns of individual schools allows an assessment on whether these abstract 
adapted Jacob and Levitt measures are meaningful when applied to the V-ANA data.   
The following series of graphs depict some of the most suspicious schools by cheating measure 
in comparison to similar clean schools. The items referred to on the horizontal axis are sorted 
according to the values of the similar schools’ average. The perceived more difficult items are 
therefore displayed on the left of the graphs whilst the easier items are displayed to the right. 
Non-suspicious school response patterns, those with low M2, M3, M4 and JL3 values, are 
expected to follow the similar clean schools average quite closely whilst highly suspicious school 
response patterns, those with high M2, M3, M4 and JL3 values, should diverge in varying degrees 
from the similar schools’ average.    
5.2.3.1 Mathematics 
There are 12 schools in total that have excessively high suspicious measure values across all three 
cheating measures as well as the composite measure, JL3. The highest suspicious measure values 
for M2, M3, M4 and JL3 respectively are 1.55, 9.58, 54.11 and 2976.40. The average assessment 
score associated with these suspicious schools is 20.11 compared to an average score of 16.20 for 
the 288 clean schools. Of the 12 schools that are in the top ten percentiles across all cheating 
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measures, four are from KwaZulu-Natal, another four are from the Eastern Cape, three are from 
the North West province and one is from Gauteng.  
Figure 2 below graphs the most suspicious school according to M4 and JL3 values, arguably the 
worst culprit. Test data was available for 28 learners in this Eastern Cape school (EC 301) who 
on average achieved a score of 16.8 out of 34. The similar schools’ average is based on 21 
schools who achieved an overall average score of between 16 and 17 out of 34. The suspicious 
school’s response pattern per item diverges significantly from that of the similar schools’ average. 
There are a number of instances where the school in question (EC 301) significantly 
outperformed the average on difficult items and drastically underperformed on some of the 
easier items.  
 
Source: V-ANA (2013) 
 
Items 24 and 33 reflect the most stark examples of where EC 301 significantly outperformed 
similar unsuspicious schools. These items were perceived to be very difficult according to the 
similar schools’ average with only 12 percent and 20 percent of comparable learners answering 
correctly. It is therefore strange that approximately 70 percent of learners in EC 301 were able to 
answer both of these items correctly. In the other direction on item 7 towards the easier 
direction of the graph only 3 percent of EC1 learners answered the item correctly compared to 
an average of 61 percent of learners in similar clean schools. 
Overall the suspicious school in question appears to display no general pattern but rather 
exceeds general expectations on more difficult questions of the assessment and underperforms 
on easier questions of the assessment leading to the overall highest M4 and JL3 values. This 
Figure 2: Illustration of Strange School EC 301 
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school therefore gains and loses its marks in very unlikely sections of the assessment and on 
average diverges from similar clean schools by 20 percent.     
The following figure displays the average response pattern from the school with the highest M2 
value in comparison to similar schools. This school should therefore display blocks of suspicious 
responses. This Eastern Cape school (EC 302) on average achieved a score of 22.9 out of 34 
based on the data available for 26 learners who took part in the assessment. The similar schools’ 
average is based on 12 clean schools who achieved an overall average score of between 22 and 
23 out of 34.     
Figure 3: Illustration of Strange School EC 302 
Source: V-ANA (2013) 
This school shows two particularly obvious cases of questionable block responses as well as a 
tendency to outperform the average. Despite generally performing better than similar schools, 
not a single student in EC 302 answered items 6, 7 and 8 correctly. This is made more suspicious 
due to the varying degrees of difficulty of these items. Items 7 and 8 were perceived to be much 
easier than item 6 so one would expect that at least some students in EC 302 would answer these 
items correctly. Learners in clean comparable schools fared significantly better than EC 302 with 
approximately 45 percent, 72 percent and 70 percent of students answering these items correct 
respectively. Item 23 and 24 reflect another case of questionable student responses where the 
suspicious school in question outperformed similar schools by approximately 40 percent on 
consecutive questions deemed by students to be very difficult. The suspicious blocks of strings 
evident in this schools average response pattern drives the M2 value upwards.  
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In addition to suspect blocks of item responses, EC 302 shows particularly extreme results. 
Using a threshold of 95 percent of students answering a question correctly, the school in 
question displays 5 items fulfilling this criterion against 2.5 items for similar schools. Similarly 
EC 302 reports 4 items compared to 1 when analysing the number of items where less than 10 
percent of students got the answer correct. These blocks of uniformed responses and extreme 
positive and negative average student responses points to some form of assessment 
manipulation.   
Figure 4 below reveals the average response pattern from the school with the highest M3 value 
in comparison to similar clean schools. This school should therefore display suspiciously high 
cross-question variance. The average school response pattern for KZN 303 is calculated from 
the 25 students who took part in this test and who on average achieved a score of 22.2 out of 34. 
The similar schools’ average is based on 12 schools which achieved an overall average score of 
between 22 and 23 out of 34.     
 
Figure 4: Illustration of Strange School KZN 303 
Source: V-ANA (2013) 
 
The school in question, KZN 303, reflects large differences in the percentage of students 
answering consecutive questions correctly. This is particularly evident over items 7 and 8, and 23 
and 24. This school faired much worse than comparable clean schools over items 7 and 8, which 
were deemed to be relatively easy. In addition to underperforming over these questions, there is 
a 40 percent increase in the number of students with these items correct between item 7 and 
item 8 in KZN 303. A similar occurrence is seen over items 23 and 24 which were perceived by 
similar students to be very difficult. In this instance the suspicious school performed 
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considerably better than similar clean schools. Just less than 50 percent and over 80 percent of 
students in the strange school answered items 23 and 24 correctly compared to similar clean 
schools where on average 40 percent and 34 percent of students answered these items correctly 
respectively. Overall student responses in KZN 303 seem to vary greatly across consecutive 
items and display no particular pattern.  
The following school is shown to be clean, presenting very low values for the cheating measures 
created. There is test data on 26 students in this school who on average answered 22 out of 34 
items correct on the assessment. The similar schools’ average is based on 12 schools who 
achieved an overall average score between 22 and 23 out of 34. This school diverges from the 
average generally for questions considered more difficult by similar schools. In these instances 
the school in question fares worse than the average which is to be expected. On questions 
deemed slightly easier, this unsuspicious school has outperformed the average. Overall KZN 304 
follows the average pattern of similar clean schools which is suggested by the low cheating 
measure values.   
 
Figure 5: Illustration of Non-Strange School KZN 304 
Source: V-ANA (2013) 
 
It is interesting to note that many of the suspicious schools struggled or performed well over the 
same items. In general these schools performed better than similar clean schools on more 
difficult questions such as items 23, 24 and 33 and fared worse than similar clean schools on 
easier questions such as items 6, 7 and 8. Some of the items over which suspicious schools 





Item 6: Question 6 
6) Arrange 1half, 1 quarter, 1 third, 1 fifth from the greatest to the smallest. 
 A 1 quarter,     1 half,             1 fifth,             1 third 
 B 1 half,            1 third,           1 quarter,       1 fifth 
 C 1 third,          1 fifth,            1 quarter,       1 half 
 D 1 fifth,           1 quarter,      1 third,            1 half 
Item 7 & 8: Question 7.1 & 7.2  
7) Write the name of the given 3D object and 2D shape. 
7.1)      7.2)  
 
 
___________________   __________________ 
 
 
Source: ANA (2013), Department of Basic Education 
 
  
Source: ANA (2013), Department of Basic Education 
   
Box 2: Grade 3 Mathematics Items over which Suspicious Schools Underperformed 
Item 23: Question 19 
19) John, Jim and Joan each have 37 lollipops. How many lollipops do they have altogether? 
Item 24: Question 20 
20) There are 36 chocolates in a box. Each child gets 5 chocolates. How many children got 
chocolates? How many chocolates were left over? 
Item 33: Question 26 
26) Complete the sentence below: 
 
 The time on the analogue clock reads ____________________. 
 
Box 1: Grade 3 Mathematics Items on which Suspicious Schools Outperformed the Average 
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5.2.4.2 Home Language 
There are 8 schools in total that have excessively high values across all three cheating measures, 
M2, M3 and M4, as well as the composite measure, JL3. The highest suspicious measure values 
for these measures are 1.36, 10.16, 29.32, and 863.30. The average assessment score associated 
with these suspicious schools is 15.46 compared to an average score of 10.69 for the 298 clean 
schools. Of these 8 schools that are in the top ten percentiles across all cheating measures, three 
are from KwaZulu-Natal, another two are from the Free State, one is from Limpopo and 
another is from the Eastern Cape.    
Figure 6 graphs the average item responses of the most suspicious school according to M4 and 
JL3 values. Student responses are available for the 25 learners who wrote the Home Language 
assessment and on average achieved a score of 19.2 out of 27 in this KwaZulu-Natal school, 
KZN 305. The similar schools’ average is based on 12 schools who achieved an overall average 
score of between 18 and 21 out of 27. The suspicious school’s responses show a general pattern 
of underperforming on easier questions and over-performing on more difficult questions 
compared to similar clean schools. Whilst this school reflects the worst M4 score out of the 
schools that are above the 90th percentile in all the cheating measures for Home Language, this 
school’s M4 value is just over half that of the worst M4 value found in the most suspicious 
Mathematics school. This school’s item response pattern therefore does not diverge as far away 
from the similar schools’ average as was previously seen in the worst culprit for Mathematics.  
Figure 6: Illustration of Strange School KZN 305 
Source: V-ANA (2013) 
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There are a number of average student responses which suggest that learners in this school 
achieved their marks in a dubious manner. Items 5 and 6 were deemed relatively easy 
comprehension questions with 60 percent to 75 percent of comparable students in similar 
schools answering these consecutive questions correctly. KZN 305, however, performed 
considerably worse with an average of only 36 percent and 20 percent of students answering 
these respective items correctly. In the other direction this school consistently outperformed 
similar clean schools by approximately 36 percent over 4 of the most difficult items.  
Overall students in this school gained most of their marks over the more difficult questions in 
the assessment, whilst losing marks on the easier section of the assessment. This school does 
display implausible school-level item averages; however, these are not as obvious as those seen in 
the Mathematics assessment.   
The following school displays the worst M2 value and second worst M3 value out of the 8 
suspicious schools. The average score achieved by the 24 learners in this school was 14.46 out of 
27. The similar schools’ average is based on 12 schools where students on average achieved score 
of between 14 and 15 items correct out of a potential 27. This Northern Cape school does show 
definite signs of suspicious behaviour in the form of suspicious blocks of student responses and 
high cross-question variance.  
 
Figure 7: Illustration of Strange School NC 306 
Source: V-ANA (2013) 
 
Over items 12 and 13, NC 306 on average outperformed similar schools by nearly 70 percent. In 
addition item 11 was the first and considerably much easier of the three part question, however, 
only 30 percent of students in NC 306 answered the question correctly. NC 306 therefore 
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underperformed on the seemingly easier item, but fared significantly better than similar 
unsuspicious schools on the more difficult items. Further cross-question variation can be seen 
over items 6, 7 and 8. The suspicious blocks of item responses and steep variation across items 
indicate that some form of cheating or suspicious behaviour may have taken place during the 
assessment.  
This next school displays the worst M3 value which indicates a high cross question variance. 
This KwaZulu-Natal school has test data on 12 learners and appears to have done relatively well 
with students on average achieving a score of 17.5 out of 27. As is evident through the graph, 
this school shows extremes in the percentages of students with items correct. Either almost all 
students got the item in question correct or almost all students got the item incorrect, which 
indicates cheating may have taken place. The similar schools’ average is based on 13 schools 
which achieved an average score of between 17 and 18.  
 
Figure 8: Illustration of Strange School KZN 307 
Source: V-ANA (2013) 
 
There are a number of item responses in this school which reflect a high cross-question variance. 
At a glance a suspiciously high number of items reflect extreme responses in this school. All 12 
learners in this school got 7 items correct when on average similar clean schools may have had 1 
or 2 items where all students answered correctly. Similarly, there were 5 items where almost all 
students answered incorrectly in KZN 307 compared to an average of 1 item in similar schools.  
Specific examples showing the high degree of cross-question variance can be seen over a number 
of items. Items 11, 12 and 13 refer to a three-part question covering easy, moderate and difficult 
questions. Over these items the student response pattern swings from beating the similar clean 
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schools average with all students answering item 11 correctly, to item 12 where not a single 
student gets the answer right to item 13 where KZN 307 once again fairs better than similar 
unsuspicious schools. Further examples to this effect involve items 15 and 16 as well as items 22 
and 23. This school shows a dubious number of extreme responses resulting in an overall 
divergence from similar unsuspicious schools of 30 percent.   
Figure 9 illustrates the response pattern of a school which reports no suspicious activity 
according to the cheating measures developed. This graph compares the average student 
responses from 25 students in MP 308 who on average received a score of 17.76 out of 27 with 
the average student responses of 13 similar clean schools who achieved a score of between 17 
and 18. This school diverges from the similar schools’ average to a much lower degree than 
those schools displaying high suspicious measures. In addition this clean school follows the 
general pattern observed for similar unsuspicious schools which is expected given the very low 
cheating measure values observed.  
 
Figure 9: Illustration of Non-Strange School MP 308 
Source: V-ANA (2013) 
 
With regards to the Language assessment, many of the suspicious schools outperformed the 
average over the same items such as items 9 and 10 and items 12 and 13. However, the 
suspicious schools varied over the items on which they underperformed. Overall suspicious 
schools seem to have fared worse on comprehension based items such as item 5, 6 and 27. Some 
of the items over which suspicious schools deviated most from the similar schools’ average are 




Source: ANA (2013), Department of Basic Education  
Source: ANA (2013), Department of Basic Education  
Item 5 & 6: Question 5 & 6 (comprehension based) 
5) “Nkosi Sikelel iAfrika” is our National Anthem. What made Enoch write this song?
Enoch wrote “Nkosi Sikelel iAfrika” because ...
6) In your opinion, why did Enoch become famous?
Enoch became famous because …
Item 27: Question 15 
15) Write two paragraphs of at least 10 sentences in total about a visit to a farm. Make sure
that you use the correct punctuation, grammar and spelling. Do not number your
sentences.
Box 3: Grade 3 Language Items on which Suspicious Schools Outperformed the Average 
Box 4: Grade 3 Language Items over which Suspicious Schools Underperformed 
Item 9 & 10: Question 8.1 & 8.2 
8) Rewrite the sentences in the given tenses.
8.1) Past tense. 
The farmer feeds the rabbits, while the children watch.  
8.2) Present tense. 
The pig played in the mud, while the horses galloped in the field. 
Item 11, 12 & 13: Question 9.1 & 9.2 & 9.3 
9. Read:
9.1) A noun is a naming word. Circle two nouns in the sentence below.
The dog wags its tail.
9.2) A pronoun is a word in the place of a noun. Circle two pronouns in the sentence below.
The farmer and his wife love the animals on their farm.
9.3) A conjunction is a joining word. Circle one conjunction in each of the sentences below.
a. The pigs ate their food and went to sleep.




The cheating measures here discussed were created and adapted from the Jacob and Levitt 
method in order to suit the ANA data. As such the previous selection of graphs were used to 
reveal whether these measures reflect in the school response patterns that which they are meant 
to reflect given their cheating indicator values. These graphs suggest that the suspicious 
indicators developed do allow for a meaningful interpretation of the data relating to the extent of 
cheating in national assessments.   
Previous analysis of the V-ANA data by Gustafsson (2014) suggests that in the South African 
context, M2 and M3 measures may reflect the cleanliness of the data more than indicating 
potential cheating. However, the response patterns from graphs with high values for these 
measures clearly show that this is not the case. Those schools with high M2 values reflect 
suspicious blocks of answer strings whilst those schools with high M3 measures do display a 
high cross-question variance. These observations are particularly clear when there are no other 
confounding suspicious measure values.  
Higher M4 values and school response patterns indicate that suspicious behaviour is more 
prevalent in Mathematics assessments compared to Language. M4 values, which show an overall 
degree of the implausibility of a schools average item response pattern, are almost halved for the 
Home Language assessment compared to the values seen for Mathematics. This results in 12 
schools being identified as extremely suspicious for Mathematics whilst only 8 meet these criteria 
for Home Language in Grade 3. Overall it is evident that through these adapted measures, it is 
now possible to detect suspicious or outright cheating behaviour through a school’s average 
student response pattern.  
5.3.  Detailed Analysis of Grade 6      
This section investigates and discusses the prevalence of cheating in Grade 6 Mathematics and 
Language assessments with respect to the V-ANA and SACMEQ data. SACMEQ is the 
southern and eastern Africa consortium for monitoring educational quality. This study covers the 
conditions of schooling and quality of education in a host of southern and eastern African 
countries using reading, math and health assessments (Moloi & Chetty, 2011). South Africa 
participated in the SACMEQ project for the second time in 2007. SACMEQ assessments are 
carried out only for Grade 6 students and are designed according to the curriculum which allows 
for a direct comparison with the results of the Grade 6 South African ANA. One would expect 
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the SACMEQ data to display very low levels or no evidence of cheating due to the constant 
methodology and instruments applied across years (Moloi & Chetty, 2011). Furthermore, the 
SACMEQ tests are marked centrally in each province rather than in each school or district as has 
been the case for the ANAs.  
Comparison between these two sets of assessments is informative as it gives an indication of 
what the ANA data ought to look like. It is important to note that some of the trends displayed 
in the SACMEQ data may differ from those shown in the ANA data. This is most likely due to 
the six-year gap between the 2007 SACMEQ data and the 2013 ANA data. Both the SACMEQ 
and ANA Mathematics and Language assessments are administered in only English and 
Afrikaans. The SACMEQ assessments, however, include only multiple choice questions whilst 
the ANAs vary in difficulty ranging from simple one mark answers or multiple choice questions 
to more difficult comprehensive or computational questions. Results for both Mathematics and 
Language are reported and compared. 
5.3.1 Summary Statistics for V-ANA and SACMEQ Cheating Measures 
The following table shows the summary statistics of cheating measures for Grade 6 Mathematics. 
A total of 387 and 392 schools are discussed for Mathematics with regards to the V-ANA and 
SACMEQ results respectively. Most of the cheating indicators reported below are lower for 
SACMEQ than for ANA which suggests either a greater degree of cheating in the ANA or a 
difference in the methodology and instruments used between the SACMEQ and ANA 
assessments.  
Table 11: Summary Statistics on Cheating Measures for Grade 6 Mathematics 
Assessment Mean SD Min 10th % Median 90th % Max 
Noted 
Schools 
Mathematics Grade 6               
M2 ANA   0.35 0,21 0.01 0.16 0.31 0.53 2.06 53 
M3 ANA   1.00 1,74 0.00 0.09 0.57 1.94 20.51 55 
M4 ANA   -0.29 15,93 -29.61 -15.49 -1.92 15.27 76.28 39 
M2 SACMEQ  0.22 0,09 0.08 0.15 0.21 0.30 1.36 42 
M3 SACMEQ 0.34 0,71 0.03 0.10 0.20 0.55 12.79 50 
M4 SACMEQ -1.13 10,96 -46.25 -13.40 -1.83 11.84 60.47 49 
Source: V-ANA (2013) & SACMEQ (2007) 
 
The M2 and M3 values reported above are lower for SACMEQ data than V-ANA data. In 
particular, SACMEQ data seems to have a narrower band of values associated with a lower 
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standard deviation. The divergence in values is greater for M3 values than for M2 values with 
this divergence increasing towards the top end of the distribution. The 90th percentile values 
reflect this starkly as the M3 90th percentile value is 1.94 for the V-ANA data compared to a 
value of 0.55 for SACMEQ data. In fact the 90th percentile M2 and M3 values for SACMEQ are 
lower than the median M2 and M3 values for the V-ANA data. With regards to M4 values, the 
SACMEQ values lie significantly and consistently below those for the V-ANA data. These 
results show that SACMEQ data presents fewer suspicious blocks of responses as well as a lower 
overall degree of correlation in student answers across the test and a lower variance in the degree 
of correlation across questions compared to the Annual National Assessments. Looking 
specifically at the M4 values, approximately 10 percent of schools show suspicious behaviour in 
the V-ANA data.  
Table 12 shows the summary statistics of cheating measures for Grade 6 Home Language. A 
total of 134 and 391 schools are discussed for this subject with regards to the V-ANA and 
SACMEQ results respectively. Due to the significantly smaller sample represented in the V-ANA 
data, Grade 6 Language values for SACMEQ data will be discussed with regards to both ANA 
Home Language (134 schools) and ANA First Additional Language (267 schools) in order to 
gain a more rounded view of the prevalence of cheating within the V-ANA data. Almost all 
summary values in the Language assessment are lower for the SACMEQ data compared to the 
V-ANA data which corroborates the findings of the summary Mathematics analysis.   
Table 12: Summary Statistics on Cheating Measures for Grade 6 Language 
Assessment Mean SD Min 10th % Median 90th % Max Schools 
Home Language  
M2 ANA   0.24 0.11 0.00 0.11 0.23 0.38 0.61 14 
M3 ANA   0.55 0.65 0.00 0.06 0.32 1.36 4.59 13 
M4 ANA   -0.40 11.69 -49.61 -12.01 0.00 12.80 35.41 14 
First Additional Language  
M2 ANA   0.41 0.14 0.12 0.25 0.39 0.58 1.05 26 
M3 ANA   1.12 1.01 0.10 0.29 0.79 2.36 5.33 29 
M4 ANA   1.21 12.92 -28.47 -14.06 -0.33 18.37 52.76 21 
Language  
M2 SACMEQ  0.21 0.07 0.08 0.14 0.20 0.29 0.88 51 
M3 SACMEQ 0.29 0.45 0.02 0.09 0.21 0.48 9.17 53 
M4 SACMEQ -0.74 8.76 -27.09 -11.69 -0.77 9.26 40.43 46 




The suspicious indicator values presented above differ substantially between Home Language 
and First Additional Language within the V-ANA data. The V-ANA Home Language 
assessment is unevenly weighted with some provinces such as Limpopo only reflecting one 
school whereas other provinces such as the Western Cape reflect significantly more schools, 34. 
This would lower the suspicious measure values of the V-ANA data as provinces shown to 
reflect suspicious behaviour report a lower school sample whilst typically unsuspicious provinces 
reflect large school samples. The First Additional Language V-ANA results therefore provide a 
more accurate reflection of suspicious behaviour in the Language assessment due to the greater 
sample size and the more even distribution of schools. This subject will henceforth be used for 
comparison against the SACMEQ Language assessment.  
SACMEQ values are on average lower than those displayed for the V-ANA data. M2 SACMEQ 
values are almost half that of the corresponding V-ANA values whilst M3 SACMEQ values are 
approximately a quarter of those seen in the corresponding V-ANA data. In addition, SACMEQ 
values reflect a more gentle gradient and on average only increase sharply past the 95th percentile. 
The SACMEQ data therefore shows lower levels of suspicious behaviour across all cheating 
indicators. Looking specifically at M4 values, there are 21 and 46 schools which exceed the 
national 90th percentile for the V-ANA and SACMEQ data respectively. Based on this criteria 
the SACMEQ data does reflect a greater number of suspicious schools, however the national 
90th percentile values on which these values are based are half of those seen for the V-ANA data.    
The following tables, tables 13 and 14, show combinations of high measure values for Grade 6 
Mathematics and Language subjects. Schools exceeding the 90th percentile values for the 
individual cheating measures, or composite measure, were considered to have high measure 
values and were assigned a value of “1”. These tables provide a cursory check and display a more 
conservative estimate of the prevalence of cheating in the ANA and SACMEQ data.  
If one assumes that only those schools exhibiting high measure values across all cheating 
measures are engaged in suspicious behaviour then only 4.13 percent and 2.3 percent of schools 
can be labelled as “cheater schools” in the V-ANA and the SACMEQ data for Mathematics 
respectively. This is most likely the lower bound of the prevalence of cheating in Grade 6 
Mathematics. The extent of suspicious behaviour in the V-ANA data is almost double that 
experienced in the SACMEQ data. Assessing the combinations of high measure values for the 
Language assessment, the V-ANA First Additional Language data presents the highest 
prevalence of suspicious behaviour, 2.62 percent compared to 0.77 percent found in the 
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SACMEQ data. As seems common throughout the grades, suspicious behaviour is more 
prominent in Mathematics than Language. 
Table 13: Combinations of High Value Cheating Measures for Grade 6 Mathematics 
Suspicious Answer String Measures Noted Schools 
M2 M3 M4 JL3 ANA (%) SACMEQ (%) 
0 0 0 0 294 75.97 282 71.94 
0 0 1 0 8 2.07 19 4.85 
1 1 0 1 0 0 3 0.77 
1 1 1 1 16 4.13 9 2.3 
0 1 0 0 14 3.62 18 4.59 
1 0 0 0 6 1.55 6 1.53 
1 1 0 0 25 6.46 17 4.34 
0 0 1 1 9 2.33 16 4.08 
Other less frequent combinations 15 3.88 22 5.61 
Total Schools     387  392  
Source: V-ANA (2013) & SACMEQ (2007) 
 
Table 14: Combinations of High Value Cheating Measures for Grade 6 Language 
Suspicious Answer String Measures Noted Schools 
M2 M3 M4 JL3 ANA (FAL) (%) SACMEQ (%) 
0 0 0 0 210 78.65 301 76.98 
0 0 1 0 4 1.5 19 4.86 
1 1 0 1 0 0 1 0.26 
1 1 1 1 7 2.62 3 0.76 
0 1 0 0 10 3.75 14 3.57 
1 0 0 0 7 2.62 5 1.28 
1 1 0 0 9 3.37 19 4.85 
0 0 1 1 5 1.87 8 2.04 
Other less frequent combinations 15 5.62 21 5.36 
Total Schools     267  391  




5.3.2 Analysis of Cheating Measures by Province 
At a summary glance, the national perspective previously discussed shows that the prevalence of 
cheating is on average the same for Grade 3 and Grade 6; however, the cheating measure values 
reported are higher for Grade 6 in both Mathematics and Language. This national average 
however, may be hiding provincial trends as was the case with the Grade 3 results. This section 
will analyse whether all provinces are affected by cheating or suspicious behaviour to the same 
extent.  
The following series of tables reflect the extent of suspicious behaviour by province for 
Mathematics and Language with respect to the V-ANA and SACMEQ data. Tables 15 to 19 
display the prevalence of suspicious behaviour by province for the Mathematics assessment 
whilst tables 20 to 24 display the prevalence of suspicious behaviour by province for the 
Language assessment. Overall the SACMEQ data displays lower average suspicious measure 
values compared to the V-ANA data; however, the V-ANA and SAQMEQ data display different 
trends. This may indicate that there is either a significant difference between the targeting of 
these two assessments or that the distributions within provinces have changed drastically since 
2007. Suspicious measure values report stark contrasts between provinces and once again these 
values are generally higher for Mathematics than for Language. 
Table 9a shows the actual 90th percentile values of the cheating measures by province for the V-
ANA and SACMEQ data with respect to the Mathematics assessment.  
Table 15: 90th Percentile Cheating Measure Values by Province for Grade 6 Mathematics 
Source: V-ANA (2013) & SACMEQ (2007) 
Province
M2 M3 M4 N M2 M3 M4 N
EC 0,63 4,59 13,93 39 0,52 1,85 21,13 50
FS 0,59 2,39 19,9 40 0,31 0,54 9,3 40
GP 0,54 1,08 46,76 51 0,23 0,32 5,85 43
KZN 1,07 4,98 26,54 42 0,27 0,5 10,93 64
LP 0,56 2,03 4,94 42 0,27 0,4 18,27 40
MP 0,41 1,04 7,34 42 0,27 0,39 16,07 37
NC 0,46 1,33 4,3 44 0,29 0,63 11,85 40
NW 0,61 2,16 11,83 43 0,3 0,81 4,45 38
WC 0,43 1,81 6,5 44 0,33 0,74 9,68 40
National 90th 
Percentile




Within Mathematics the V-ANA and SAQMEQ data report almost opposite trends. The V-
ANA data reflects highly suspicious behaviour for Gauteng, KwaZulu-Natal and the Free State. 
M4 values, for these provinces are particularly high, in some cases three times the national 90th 
percentile values as is the case for Gauteng. KwaZulu-Natal and the Free State reflect values 
above the national 90th percentile across all three cheating measures indicating exceptionally 
suspicious item response patterns in these provinces. The SACMEQ data, however, shows high 
M4 values for the Eastern Cape, Limpopo and Mpumalanga with the Eastern Cape being the 
only province to exceed the national 90th percentile across all three measures. The national 90th 
percentile values are much lower in the SACMEQ data suggesting a much lower level of 
suspicious behaviour on these assessments.   
The 90th percentile values reported above have been used to present tables 9b to 9e, which show 
these results in a more accessible manner. Table 16 and 17 present the number and percent of 
schools which achieved cheating measure values above the national 90th percentiles whilst tables 
18 and 19 report the number and percent of these noted schools with cheating measure values at 
least two standard deviations above the national 90th percentile values, by province.  
Addressing the V-ANA results; 6 provinces display between 2 and 4 noted or suspicious schools 
which translates to between 4 percent and 10 percent of schools respectively. Whilst there seems 
to be wide spread suspicious behaviour in schools, only 1 school in Mpumalanga has cheating 
measure values greater than two standard deviations above the national 90th percentiles across all 
measures. There is significant variation between the cheating measures indicating that provinces 
may systematically use the same method to alter student assessment scores. Gauteng reflects 13 
noted schools, 25 percent, with implausible school-level item averages compared to academically 
similar schools (measure 4) compared to only 4 noted schools, 8 percent, with suspiciously high 
within class variation (measure 3). Similarly KwaZulu-Natal shows 12 noted schools, 28 percent, 
with high M3 values compared to 5 noted schools, 12 percent, with exceptionally high M4 
values.       
Addressing the SACMEQ results; 5 provinces display noted schools, however, only the Eastern 
Cape shows excessive suspicious behaviour with 7 schools, 14 percent, displaying values greater 
than the national 90th percentile. Strangely the SACMEQ results show high measure values for 
the Western and Northern Cape as well as Gauteng and the Free State, most likely showing the 
time delay between the SACMEQ III assessment in 2007 and the ANA in 2013. Tables 18 and 
19 further confirm that the Eastern Cape shows the most suspicious data with 16 percent, 12 
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percent and 2 percent of schools having cheating measures at least two standard deviations 
above the national 90th percentile for M2, M3 and M4 respectively.     
 
Table 16: Number of Noted Schools by Province for Grade 6 Mathematics 
Source: V-ANA (2013) & SACMEQ (2007) 
 
Table 17: Percent of Noted Schools by Province for Grade 6 Mathematics 




M2 M3 M4 All N M2 M3 M4 All N
EC 9 9 4 3 39 14 18 10 7 50
FS 5 6 7 3 40 4 3 2 1 40
GP 7 4 13 2 51 1 1 3 1 43
KZN 11 12 5 4 42 6 7 6 0 64
LP 7 7 3 2 42 1 0 10 0 40
MP 3 4 3 2 42 2 1 8 0 37
NC 4 3 2 0 44 3 7 5 1 40
NW 4 6 1 0 43 3 6 2 0 38
WC 3 4 1 0 44 7 7 3 1 40
Total 53 55 39 16 387 41 50 49 11 392
M2 0.53 M2 0.30
M3 1.94 M3 0.55
M4 15.27 M4 11.84
ANA SACMEQ
National 90th Percentile Cut-offs Applicable:
Province
M2 M3 M4 All N M2 M3 M4 All N
EC 23 23 10 8 39 28 36 20 14 50
FS 13 15 18 8 40 10 8 5 3 40
GP 14 8 25 4 51 2 2 7 2 43
KZN 26 29 12 10 42 9 11 9 0 64
LP 17 17 7 5 42 3 0 25 0 40
MP 7 10 7 5 42 5 3 22 0 37
NC 9 7 5 0 44 8 18 13 3 40
NW 9 14 2 0 43 8 16 5 0 38
WC 7 9 2 0 44 18 18 8 3 40
M2 0.53 M2 0.30
M3 1.94 M3 0.55
M4 15.27 M4 11.84
ANA SACMEQ




Table 18: Number of Schools at least 2 Standard Deviations above the National 90th Percentile 
for Grade 6 Mathematics 
Source: V-ANA (2013) & SACMEQ (2007) 
 
Table 19: Percent of Schools at least 2 Standard Deviations above the National 90th Percentile for 
Grade 6 Mathematics 




M2 M3 M4 All N M2 M3 M4 All N
EC 5 4 0 0 39 8 6 1 1 50
FS 0 0 1 0 40 1 3 1 1 40
GP 0 0 6 0 51 0 0 0 0 43
KZN 7 6 0 0 42 0 0 1 0 64
LP 2 1 0 0 42 0 0 0 0 40
MP 1 2 1 1 42 0 0 1 0 37
NC 1 1 1 0 44 0 0 0 0 40
NW 0 1 0 0 43 0 1 0 0 38
WC 0 0 0 0 44 0 0 0 0 40
Total 16 15 9 16 387 9 10 4 2 392
M2 0.94 M2 0.49
M3 5.43 M3 1.97




M2 M3 M4 All N M2 M3 M4 All N
EC 13 10 0 0 39 16 12 2 2 50
FS 0 0 3 0 40 3 8 3 3 40
GP 0 0 12 0 51 0 0 0 0 43
KN 17 14 0 0 42 0 0 2 0 64
LP 5 2 0 0 42 0 0 0 0 40
MP 2 5 2 2 42 0 0 3 0 37
NC 2 2 2 0 44 0 0 0 0 40
NW 0 2 0 0 43 0 3 0 0 38
WC 0 0 0 0 44 0 0 0 0 40
M2 0.94 M2 0.49
M3 5.43 M3 1.97





With regards to Language, table 20 as seen below, shows the actual 90th percentile values of the 
cheating measures by province for the V-ANA and SACMEQ data. The SACMEQ data seems 
to show a greater degree of suspicious behaviour compared to the V-ANA data. The SACMEQ 
findings, however, are based on much lower national 90th percentile values, values approximately 
half those observed for the V-ANA data. The V-ANA data shows highly suspicious behaviour 
for the Free State, Gauteng and KwaZulu-Natal. These provinces, with the exception of 
KwaZulu-Natal, exceed average 90th percentile values across all suspicious string indicators. The 
SACMEQ data, as with Mathematics, reports significantly lower suspicious measure values. The 
Eastern Cape, Limpopo and Western Cape display M4 values above the national 90th percentile, 
however only the Eastern Cape displays noted values across all measures.  
Table 20: 90th Percentile Cheating Measure Values by Province for Grade 6 Language 
Source: V-ANA (2013) & SACMEQ (2007) 
 
The 90th percentile values reported above have been used to present tables 21 to 24, which show 
these results in a more accessible manner. Table 21 and 22 presents the number and percent of 
schools which achieved cheating measure values above the national 90th percentiles whilst tables 
23 and 24 report the number and percent of these noted schools with cheating measure values at 
least two standard deviations above the national 90th percentile values, by province. These tables 
corroborate the findings of table 20. Gauteng and the Free State are shown to be the most 
suspicious provinces with regard to the V-ANA data whilst the Eastern Cape displays the most 
suspicious cheating measure statistics in the SACMEQ data.  
Strangely the V-ANA results display higher national 90th percentile values for Language 
compared to Mathematics. As such only 8 schools have cheating measure values greater than the 
Province
M2 M3 M4 N M2 M3 M4 N
EC 0,55 1,88 7,57 35 0,34 1,03 13,55 49
FS 0,69 3,96 31,6 35 0,27 0,41 8,79 40
GP 0,58 3,72 29,39 29 0,24 0,34 8,04 43
KZN 0,47 1,76 19,64 28 0,3 0,48 4,04 64
LP 0,55 1,77 2,31 40 0,28 0,43 19,68 40
MP 0,47 1,48 -0,61 35 0,29 0,67 8,68 37
NC 0,46 1,27 10,25 20 0,3 0,47 7,25 40
NW 0,57 2,29 15,24 35 0,27 0,4 7,93 38
WC 0,54 2 16,84 10 0,26 0,53 10,19 40
National 90th 
Percentile
0.58 2.36 18.37 267 0.29 0.48 9.26 391
ANA First Additional Language SACMEQ Language
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national 90th percentile values across all measures. Noted schools are evident in 5 provinces with 
the Free State and Gauteng displaying the worst results, 2 and 3 schools or 6 percent and 10 
percent respectively. The Free State furthermore reports one school with cheating measure 
values greater than two standard deviations above the national 90th percentiles across all 
measures. The V-ANA data suggests that there was no systematic method of cheating on the 
language assessment but rather that if a province shows any form of suspicious behaviour then it 
mostly likely shows positive M2, M3 and M4 values.  
The SACMEQ data follows the usual trend with lower suspicious values for the Language 
assessment compared to the Mathematics assessment. Overall 11 schools display suspicious data, 
5 of which are in the Eastern Cape. The Eastern Cape is further confirmed as the most 
suspicious province with 3 schools, 6 percent, that report cheating measure values greater than 
two standard deviations above the national 90th percentiles across all measures. The SACMEQ 
data reveals the same trends for the Mathematics and Language assessments.    
Table 21: Number of Noted Schools by Province for Grade 6 Language 










M2 M3 M4 All N M2 M3 M4 All N
EC 4 2 1 0 35 16 16 9 5 49
FS 6 6 5 2 35 3 1 3 0 40
GP 4 7 6 3 29 0 1 5 0 43
KZN 3 2 2 1 28 8 8 5 1 64
LP 2 1 0 0 40 5 6 11 1 40
MP 2 3 1 1 35 4 7 3 1 37
NC 3 4 3 1 20 7 3 2 0 40
NW 2 4 3 0 35 4 5 4 1 38
WC 0 0 0 0 10 4 6 4 2 40
Total 26 29 21 8 267 51 53 46 11 391
M2 0.58 M2 0.28
M3 2.36 M3 0.48
M4 18.37 M4 9.26
ANA SACMEQ 




Table 22: Percent of Noted Schools by Province for Grade 6 Language 
Source: V-ANA (2013) & SACMEQ (2007) 
 
Table 23: Number of Schools at least 2 Standard Deviations above the National 90th Percentile 
for Grade 6 Language 





M2 M3 M4 All N M2 M3 M4 All N
EC 11 6 3 0 35 33 33 18 10 50
FS 17 17 14 6 35 8 3 8 0 40
GP 14 24 21 10 29 0 2 12 0 43
KZN 11 7 7 4 28 13 13 8 2 64
LP 5 3 0 0 40 13 15 28 3 40
MP 6 9 3 3 35 11 19 8 3 37
NC 15 20 15 5 20 18 8 5 0 40
NW 6 11 9 0 35 11 13 11 3 38
WC 0 0 0 0 10 10 15 10 5 40
M2 0.58 M2 0.28
M3 2.36 M3 0.48
M4 18.37 M4 9.26
ANA SACMEQ 
National 90th Percentile Cut-offs Applicable:
Province
M2 M3 M4 All N M2 M3 M4 All N
EC 1 1 0 0 35 4 6 3 3 50
FS 1 2 1 1 35 0 0 0 0 40
GP 1 1 0 0 29 0 0 0 0 43
KZN 1 0 0 0 28 2 1 0 0 64
LP 0 0 0 0 40 0 2 2 0 40
MP 1 0 1 0 35 0 2 0 0 37
NC 0 2 0 0 20 0 0 0 0 40
NW 0 1 0 0 35 0 1 0 0 38
WC 0 0 0 0 10 0 0 0 0 40
Total 5 7 2 1 267 6 12 5 3 392
M2 0.86 M2 0.42
M3 4.38 M3 1.39




Table 24: Percent of Schools at least 2 Standard Deviations above the National 90th Percentile for 
Grade 6 Language 
Source: V-ANA (2013) & SACMEQ (2007) 
The above tables display sharp contrasts between those provinces that do engage in cheating 
behaviour and those that don’t. The V-ANA data displays higher national 90th percentile values 
for the Language assessment while the SACMEQ data follows the usual trend with higher 
measure values displayed for the Mathematics assessment. The V-ANA and SACMEQ data 
display different provincial trends in both the Mathematics and Language assessments most 
likely due to the 6 year time difference between the two assessments. Overall, the SACMEQ 
suspicious measure values presented were lower than those displayed for the V-ANA data.  
With regards to the Mathematics assessment, KwaZulu-Natal, the Eastern Cape and the Free 
State are reported as the most suspicious provinces with respect to the V-ANA data. Over all 
suspicious measures, only the Eastern Cape exhibits highly suspicious results with regards to the 
SACMEQ data. The V-ANA data generally shows a broader spread of suspicious behaviour 
compared to the SACMEQ data which shows very concentrated cheating in the Eastern Cape. 
In the Language assessment, Gauteng and the Free State are shown to be the most suspicious 
provinces according to the V-ANA data whilst the Eastern Cape displays the most suspicious 
cheating measure statistics in the SACMEQ data.   
For Mathematics overall only 4 percent of schools nationally show cheating measures above the 
90th percentile across all measures compared to 2.8 percent for SACMEQ. For language 3 
Province
M2 M3 M4 All N M2 M3 M4 All N
EC 3 4 0 0 35 8 12 6 6 50
FS 3 6 3 3 35 0 0 0 0 40
GP 3 3 0 0 29 0 0 0 0 43
KZN 4 0 0 0 28 3 2 0 0 64
LP 0 0 0 0 40 0 5 5 0 40
MP 3 0 3 0 35 0 5 0 0 37
NC 0 10 0 0 20 0 0 0 0 40
NW 0 3 0 0 35 0 3 0 0 38
WC 0 0 0 0 10 0 0 0 0 40
M2 0.86 M2 0.42
M3 4.38 M3 1.39
M4 44.20 M4 26.77




percent in both datasets have noted schools. This perspective hides stark provincial differences 
in V-ANA data with 10 percent of schools in KwaZulu-Natal and Gauteng reporting excessively 
high cheating values across all 3 measures in the Mathematics and Language assessments 
respectively. These values vary to greater degrees when considering individual cheating measures. 
5.3.3 Patterns within Individual Schools 
This section will explore individual suspicious schools and compare these to the average patterns 
displayed by similar clean or unsuspicious schools. In this instance similar clean schools refer to 
those unsuspicious schools which on average achieved the same overall score on the assessment 
as the suspicious school in question. Comparing the patterns of individual schools allows an 
assessment on whether these abstract adapted Jacob and Levitt measures are meaningful when 
applied to the V-ANA data, and how the V-ANA data differs to the patterns observed in the 
SACMEQ data.   
The following series of graphs depict some of the most suspicious schools by cheating measure 
in comparison to similar clean schools. The items referred to on the horizontal axis are sorted 
according to the values of the similar schools’ average. The perceived more difficult items are 
therefore displayed on the left of the graphs whilst the easier items are displayed to the right. 
Non-suspicious school patterns, those with low M2, M3, M4 and JL3 values, are expected to 
follow the similar schools’ average quite closely whilst highly suspicious school patterns, those 
with high M2, M3, M4 and JL3 values, should diverge in varying degrees from the similar 
schools’ average. The assigned suspicious school names give information on the province of the 
school, the grade, the order of the school being discussed and whether the school took part in 
the ANA or the SACMEQ assessment such as KZN 605 (S).    
5.3.3.1 Mathematics  
There are 16 schools in total that have excessively high suspicious measure values across all three 
cheating measures as well as the composite measure, JL3 in the Grade 6 V-ANA Mathematics 
data. The highest suspicious measure values for M2, M3, M4 and JL3 respectively are 2.06, 20.51, 
67.76 and 4651.11 which are much higher than the values noted for Grade 3 Mathematics, in 
some cases double. The average assessment score associated with these suspicious schools is 22.9 
compared to an average score of 16.08 for the 294 clean schools. Of the 16 schools that are in 
the top ten percentiles across all cheating measures, four are from KwaZulu-Natal, three each are 
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from the Eastern Cape and the Free State and two each are from Gauteng, Mpumalanga and 
Limpopo. 
There are 9 schools with excessively high suspicious measure values across all cheating measures 
in the Grade 6 SACMEQ Mathematics data. The highest suspicious measure values for M2, M3, 
M4 and JL3 respectively are 1.36, 9.38, 60.47 and 3666.95 which are lower than the values noted 
for Grade 6 V-ANA Mathematics. The average assessment score associated with these 
suspicious schools is 20.67 compared to an average score of 18.08 for the 282 clean schools. Of 
the 9 schools that are in the top ten percentiles across all cheating measures, seven are from the 
Eastern Cape whilst one school each is from the Northern Cape and Free State. 
Figures 10 and 11 below graph the most suspicious schools in the V-ANA and SACMEQ data 
according to M4 and JL3 values. Test data was available for 24 learners in the V-ANA suspicious 
school in Mpumalanga which on average achieved a score of 17 out of 50. The similar schools’ 
average is based on 19 unsuspicious schools which achieved an overall average score of between 
17 and 18 out of 50. Comparatively the suspicious SACMEQ school has data on 20 students 
who on average achieved a score of 25 out of 50. The SACMEQ similar schools average is based 
on 16 clean schools which on average achieved a score between 24 and 26 out of 50.  
In both figures the suspicious school’s response pattern diverges significantly from that of the 
similar schools’ average as suggested by the high M4 values. This finding however is more 
prominent in the V-ANA suspicious schools with a much higher number of extreme responses 
compared to the SACMEQ suspicious school; there were 24 cases where less than 10 percent or 
greater than 90 percent of students in MP 601 (S) got the item correct.  Over the assessment the 
V-ANA suspicious school on average deviates from similar school responses by 29 percent 
whilst the SACMEQ suspicious school on average deviates from similar school responses by 19 
percent. The V-ANA suspicious school appears to display no trend, drastically outperforming or 
underperforming compared to the similar schools’ average. The SACMEQ suspicious school 
tends to outperform similar schools on difficult questions and underperform on questions 




Figure 10: Illustration of Strange School MP 601 (A) 
Source: V-ANA (2013)  
Figure 11: Illustration of Strange School FS 602 (S) 
Source: SACMEQ (2007) 
Figures 12 and 13 below graph the schools with very high M2 and M3 values with respect to the 
V-ANA and SACMEQ data. These schools should show suspicious blocks of item answers and
a high cross-question variance. Test data was available for 25 learners in the V-ANA suspicious 
Eastern Cape school which on average achieved a score of 25 out of 50. The similar schools’ 
average is based on 11 unsuspicious schools which achieved an overall average score of between 
23 and 26. Comparatively the suspicious SACMEQ school has data on 17 students who on 
average achieved a score of 22 out of 50. The SACMEQ similar schools average is based on 16 
clean schools which on average achieved a score between 20 and 22 out of 50. Both suspicious 
62 
 
blocks of response patterns and high cross-question variance are evident in the suspicious V-
ANA and SACMEQ schools shown below. These suspicious responses are more pronounced in 
the V-ANA school who’s M2 and M3 values are approximately double those of the SACMEQ 
school.  
With respect to the V-ANA data, the suspicious Eastern Cape school seems to frequently beat 
the similar schools’ average on some of the more difficult questions, towards the left of the 
graph, and underperform on questions deemed easier by students in similar schools, towards the 
right of the graph. Furthermore, the responses on items 13, 14, 47 and 48 showcase the dodgy 
nature of this schools data. The suspicious school performs significantly poorer than similar 
schools over items 13 and 14, but outperforms similar schools by approximately 20 percent over 
items 47 and 48. All these items are deemed to be relatively easy with over 70 percent of students 
in similar schools answering correctly. The large difference in correct responses over these items 
of relative equal difficulty is therefore unexpected and points to interference in the assessment or 
assessment scripts. There are also a number of instances where the percentage of learners with 
an item correct changes drastically over consecutive items and 22 cases of extreme responses, 
where less than 10 percent or greater than 90 percent of students answered an item correctly.  
Figure 12: Illustration of Strange School EC 603 (A) 
 
Source: V-ANA (2013)  
 
With respect to the SACMEQ data, the suspicious Eastern Cape school seems to follow the 
trend of the similar schools’ average at either end, on the hardest and easiest questions of the 
assessment, but diverges significantly over questions of average difficulty. The data displays a 
number of suspicious responses where the school in question either fared better or worse than 
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similar clean schools. Items 19 and 20 reflect the most suspicious block of responses as the 
suspicious school on average outperforms similar schools by approximately 40 percent to 50 
percent. This is made more suspicious due to the varying degree of difficulty of these items. 
More than 80 percent of learners in the suspicious school answered these consecutive items 
correctly even though item 19 was deemed significantly more difficult than item 20 by similar 
performing students. Items 12, 13, 14 and 15 show another block of suspicious responses where 
students in EC 604 (S) significantly outperformed similar schools over questions of varying 
difficulty. Furthermore there are a number of instances where the percentage of learners with 
consecutive items correct changes drastically as seen over items 20 and 21 and 26 and 27. This 
school’s response pattern follows the similar schools’ average to a greater degree than that seen 
in the V-ANA data and reflects 15 cases of extreme responses compared to 22 respectively. 
 
Figure 13: Illustration of Strange School EC 604 (S) 
 
Source: SACMEQ (2007) 
 
The following schools reflect unsuspicious responses, presenting very low values for the cheating 
measures created. The V-ANA Western Cape school achieved an average score of 20 out of 50 
based on responses from 24 students. The similar schools’ average is based on 12 unsuspicious 
schools which achieved an overall average score between 20 and 21 out of 50. The SACMEQ 
KwaZulu-Natal clean school achieved an overall average score of 24 out of 50 based on the 
responses of 23 learners. The similar schools’ average is based on 17 clean schools which 
achieved an overall average score between 23 and 26.  
These schools deviate only slightly from their respective clean similar schools average, 9 percent 
for the V-ANA school and 6 percent for the SACMEQ school. These schools follow the 
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expected trend where almost all students are able to answer the easiest questions correctly, after 
which the percentage of correct student responses decreases as the questions become more 
difficult.  
 
Figure 14: Illustration of Non-Strange School WC 605 (A) 
 
Source: V-ANA (2013)  
 
Figure 15: Illustration of Non-Strange School KZN 606 (S) 
 
Source: SACMEQ (2007) 
 
The following box shows some of the ANA items suspicious schools typically found easy or 
answered well. These items cover a range of skills including measurement, equations and number 
sequences or groups. Item 3 was deemed easy by similar clean schools whilst items 4 and 12 
were seen as significantly more difficult. The same multiple choice SACMEQ assessments are 





Source: ANA (2013), Department of Basic Education  
 
This next box displays some of the ANA items on which students of suspicious schools 
answered poorly. These items include numeric calculations, angles and price comparisons. Items 
14 and 33 were deemed relatively easy whilst item 42 was perceived to be more difficult by 
similar clean schools. Over these items, schools with suspicious cheating values typically 
performed worse than similar unsuspicious schools.   
Item 3 and 4: Question 1.3 and 1.4 
1.3) What is the length of the pencil shown below? 
 
 
The length of the pencil is … 
A) 56 cm 
B) 5,6 mm 
C) 0,56 m 
D) 5,6 cm 
1.4) 22 + 35 = 63 -   , means that     =  …..  
 A) 6 
 B) 28 
 C) 41 
 D) 57 
Item 12: Question 3 
3) Write down the next prime number. 
 19   ,   23   ,   29   ,   _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _  
 
Box 5: Grade 6 Mathematics Items on which Suspicious Schools Outperformed the Average 
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Box 6: Grade 6 Mathematics Items over which Suspicious Schools Underperformed 
Source: ANA (2013), Department of Basic Education  
5.3.4.2 Language  
In total, 7 schools have excessively high suspicious measure values across all three cheating 
measures as well as the composite measure, JL3 in the Grade 6 V-ANA First Additional 
Language data. The highest suspicious measure values for M2, M3, M4 and JL3 respectively are 
Item 14: Questions 5.1 
5.1) Calculate the answer: 
43 489 + 345 987 + 307 = 
Item 33: Question 17.2 
17) Use the words above to say what kind of angles are marked in the picture.
Item 42: Question 24 
24) Examine the packets of sugar and their prices. Which is the best buy?
obtuse angle;  acute angle; right angle 
17.1  _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 
17.2  _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 
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1.05, 4.53, 52.76 and 2804.67. These values are between 1.8 and 3.2 times the values seen in the 
V-ANA Grade 3 Home Language assessment based on M4 and JL3 measures indicating 
significantly more suspicious data in the Grade 6 results. The average assessment score 
associated with these suspicious schools is 25 compared to an average score of 20.41 for the 210 
clean schools. Of the 7 schools noted across all cheating measures, three are from Gauteng with 
one each based in the Northern Cape, the Free State, Mpumalanga and KwaZulu-Natal.  
There are 8 schools in total that have excessively high suspicious measure values across all three 
cheating measures as well as the composite measure, JL3 in the Grade 6 SACMEQ Language 
data. The highest suspicious measure values for M2, M3, M4 and JL3 respectively are 0.88, 9.14, 
40.43 and 1653.54. The M2 and M3 values are very similar to those of the SACMEQ 
Mathematics assessment; however the M4 and JL3 values are almost half the value of those seen 
in Mathematics. This suggests that there are significantly fewer suspicious patterns in the 
SACMEQ language assessment compared to similar clean schools. The average assessment score 
associated with these suspicious schools is 30.41 compared to an average score of 27.98 for the 
270 clean schools. Of the 8 schools that are in the top ten percentiles across all cheating 
measures, four are from the Eastern Cape, two are from the Western Cape and one school each 
is based in KwaZulu-Natal and Mpumalanga. 
Figures 16 and 17 below graph the most suspicious schools in the V-ANA and SACMEQ data 
according to M4 and JL3 values. Test data was available for 25 learners in the Free State V-ANA 
suspicious school which achieved an average score of 23.4 out of 47. The V-ANA similar 
schools average is therefore based on 18 clean schools which scored between 23 and 24 on the 
assessment. Comparatively the SACMEQ suspicious school achieved an average assessment 
score of 29 out of 55 based on data from 11 students. The SACMEQ similar schools average is 
based on 10 clean schools which scored between 28 and 30 on the assessment.  
In both figures the suspicious school’s response pattern diverges significantly from that of the 
similar schools’ average. The V-ANA school however seems to display less suspicious responses, 
generally following the similar schools trend over questions considered by similar schools to be 
only moderately difficult. The more suspicious SACMEQ school deviates from the similar 
schools’ average by approximately 23 percent and displays double the number of extreme 
responses, 14 as opposed to 7, observed in the V-ANA school. Overall both schools seem to 
outperform the average on difficult questions and underperform compared to similar schools on 
easier questions.  
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Figure 16: Illustration of Strange School FS 607 (A) 
 
Source: V-ANA (2013) 
 
Figure 17: Illustration of Strange School EC 608 (S) 
 
Source: SACMEQ (2007) 
 
These next schools have very high M2 and M3 values with respect to the V-ANA and SACMEQ 
data. These schools should show suspicious blocks of item answers and a high cross-question 
variance. Test data was available for 25 learners in the V-ANA suspicious school from KwaZulu-
Natal which on average achieved a score of 25 out of 50. The similar schools’ average is based 
on 19 unsuspicious schools which achieved an overall average score of between 24 and 26. 
Comparatively the suspicious Eastern Cape SACMEQ school has data on 25 students who on 
average achieved a score of 47 out of 55. The SACMEQ similar schools average is based on 12 
clean schools which on average achieved a score between 44 and 47 out of 50 as no other clean 
school scored so highly.  
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With respect to the V-ANA data, KZN 609 (A) appears to deviate more from the similar 
schools’ average over the harder questions whilst broadly following the similar schools trend 
over easier questions. This school shows two stark examples of suspicious blocks of answer 
strings. Over items 45, 46 and 47 almost all students answer these consecutive items incorrectly 
whilst approximately 40 percent to 50 percent of students in similar unsuspicious schools 
answered correctly. Conversely the suspicious school fares significantly better than similar 
schools over items 35 and 36 with at least 80 percent of students answering correctly for both 
items despite the fact that item 35 was shown to be a much more difficult question. Furthermore 
there are a number of instances where the percentage of learners with an item correct changes 
drastically over consecutive items in some cases by as much as 68 percent to 80 percent, seen 
over items 2 and 3 and 14 and 15 respectively. The suspicious blocks of responses, high cross-
question variance and extreme responses displayed in this school result in an overall deviation of 
20 percent from the clean similar schools average.   
 
Figure 18: Illustration of Strange School KZN 609 (A) 
 
Source: V-ANA (2013)  
 
The suspicious Eastern Cape SACMEQ school shown below reports a high M2 and M3 value 
despite the high concentration of overall correct responses. Due to the high academic 
performance of these schools, the suspicious school follows the similar schools trend within 10 
percent over approximately half of the assessment. Given the high score achieved, this school 
reflects a high cross-question variance particularly over items 12, 13 and 14, 38 and 39 and 54 
and 55. The high cross-question variance seen over items 38 and 39 and 54 and 55 of 44 percent 
and 84 percent respectively are odd given the similar perceived difficulty of these questions. 
Items 12, 13 and 14 display the yo-yo effect of a large variance jumping from 100 percent of 
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students answering item 12 correct to just 12 percent answering item 13 correct to 100 percent 
answering items 14 and 15 correctly. In addition the suspicious school has significantly 
outperformed the similar schools’ average over some of the most difficult items. Despite the 
high academic performance displayed, EC 610 (S) deviates from the similar clean schools average 
by 13 percent. 
Figure 19: Illustration of Strange School EC 610 (S) 
Source: SACMEQ (2007)  
The following schools are shown to be clean, presenting very low values for the cheating 
measures created. The unsuspicious V-ANA school from the Free State achieved an overall 
average score of 24 out of 50 based on test data of 26 students. The similar clean schools average 
is based on 18 unsuspicious schools which achieved an overall score of between 23 and 24. The 
SACMEQ clean Mpumalanga school on average achieved an assessment score of 24 out of 55 
based on 20 students. The similar schools’ average is based on 28 unsuspicious schools which on 
average score between 23 and 24 out of 55. These schools follow the overall trend of similar 
schools with few students answering the difficult questions correctly and most students 
answering the easier questions correctly. Visually it is very easy to see that these schools do not 
display the erratic or systematic response patterns observed in the suspicious schools noted 
above. The response patterns of these clean schools deviate from the similar schools’ average to 
a much smaller degree compared to suspicious schools, on average 9 percent in the V-ANA 
clean school and 7 percent in the SACMEQ clean school.  
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Figure 20: Illustration of Non-Strange School FS 611 (A) 
 
Source: V-ANA (2013)  
 
Figure 21: Illustration of Non-Strange School MP 612 (S) 
 
Source: SACMEQ (2007)  
 
Box 7 and 8 display some of the ANA items on which suspicious schools either beat the clean 
similar schools average or underperformed. The same multiple choice SACMEQ assessments are 





Box 7: Grade 6 Language Items on which Suspicious Schools Outperformed the Average 
Source: ANA (2013), Department of Basic Education 
 
Box 8: Grade 6 Language Items over which Suspicious Schools Underperformed 
Source: ANA (2013), Department of Basic Education  
Item 14: Question 14 (Comprehension based) 
14) Circle the letter of the correct answer. 
 What does ‘the jackal flattered the crow’ mean? 
 A. He praised her more than was needed. 
 B. He gave her advice he thought would help. 
 C. He spoke to her softly and kindly. 
 D. He greeted her warmly. 
Item 35: Question 30.2 
30) Give the opposite gender of the underlined words.  
30.2 The lion would not have done something like this to the jackal. ____________________  
Item 39: Question 33 
33) Rewrite the word in brackets by adding the apostrophe (‘). 
 The jackal stole the (crows) ______________ cheese. 
Item 41: Question 35 
35) Identify the root/base word from the underlined word. 
 The queen of the birds looked very sad. ___________________ 
 
 
    
Item 15: Question 15 (Comprehension based) 
15) Did the jackal like the crow’s singing? Give a reason for your answer. 
Item 31: Question 28 
28) Write two sentences to show two different meanings of the word “back”. 
Items 45, 46 & 47: Question 38.1, 38.1 & 38.3 
38) Write to your friend and tell him/her about the day you landed into trouble at school. 
Write at least four well-linked paragraphs of 80 – 100 words in a letter format with the 
correct content. Make sure that you use the correct spelling, punctuation and grammar. 
 Mark Allocation: 38.1) Format (5 marks) 
    38.2) Language, Spelling and Punctuation (5 marks) 




As with the Grade 3 results, the Grade 6 cheating measures do reflect the suspicious response 
patterns they were designed to show. This suggests that suspicious behaviour can be investigated 
and discovered through assessment data and that these measures hold across grades, subjects and 
different assessment designs. 
Higher suspicious measure values indicate that there may be significantly more interference in 
the ANA than in the SACMEQ assessments for both Mathematics and Language subjects. At a 
national level, the SACMEQ data reflects approximately 2 percent of schools as “cheater 
schools” across Mathematics and Language whilst the ANA reflect 2.6 percent to 4 percent of 
schools as “cheater schools” in the Language and Mathematics assessments respectively. These 
results vary greatly by cheating measure and province. In the V-ANA data 10 percent of Gauteng 
schools display highly suspicious response patterns in Mathematics whilst 10 percent of 
KwaZulu-Natal schools display highly suspicious response patterns in Language across all 
measures. Over all suspicious measures, only the Eastern Cape exhibits highly suspicious results 
with regards to the SACMEQ data.    
M4 and JL3 values are higher for the Grade 6 data compared to the Grade 3 data which could 
indicate that cheating may become more robust the longer it goes undetected and as such is 
more evident in higher grades. Comparing the suspicious response patterns between Grade 3 
and Grade 6 graphically, this seems to be the case. Further analysis involving higher grades, 
however, would need to be undertaken to assess this as it has been suggested by Gustafsson 
(2014) that high schools may reflect lower levels of suspicious data responses due to their 
experience of Grade 12 examinations.  
5.4 Grade 9 
The Grade 9 V-ANA results, whilst available for Mathematics and Language, pose a number of 
estimation challenges. Only 193 and 1078 students passed Grade 9 Mathematics and Home 
Language, much fewer students than seen in other grades. The low pass rates, especially for 
Mathematics, reduce the variation in student responses, amplify the effect of outliers and affect 
the accuracy of estimation. This is especially worrying when analysing the data at a provincial 
level as the distribution of pass rates is uneven across provinces. As such the Grade 9 results will 
not be discussed here.  
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5.5 Other Interpretations 
Over Grades 3 and 6 those schools with highly suspicious response patterns on average achieve 
higher overall assessment scores when compared to clean schools. One would therefore expect 
that when a “cheater school” diverges from the similar schools’ average, they would outperform 
the similar schools’ average. There are however a number of instances where schools displaying 
suspicious data have underperformed drastically over a number of consecutive questions. School 
personnel and teachers would have no incentive to produce lower scores for students and would 
be expected to “cheat” only if the answers were known to be correct, thereby improving the 
assessment score.  For those suspicious schools that underperform over dodgy responses, it may 
be that the individual or teacher cheating does not know the correct answer, as suggested in the 
DBE ANA report, or that perhaps this section of the curriculum hasn’t yet been taught.  
Across Grade 3 and Grade 6 suspicious schools, especially those with high M2 values, the data 
was inspected for specific items where on average less than 30 percent of students answered the 
items correctly in Mathematics and Language. Looking at the response patterns, there are a 
number of items in each grade and subject which stand out as very poorly answered questions 
amongst the suspicious schools. Comparing these items to the ANA scripts however reveals that 
it is unlikely that poor performance is a result of untaught sections of the curriculum as these 
questions cover a range of skills and topics. This seems to confirm the original suspicion that 
these anomalies “may be driven by incorrect teachings within individual schools or classes” or 
that “test administration procedures may not have been properly carried out” (Department of 
Basic Education, 2011). 
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Chapter 6: Conclusion and Recommendations for Further Work 
 
 
This analysis shows that the suspicious indicators developed do allow for a meaningful 
interpretation of the data relating to the extent of cheating in national assessments. Nationally, 
cheating seems to be prevalent in at least 10 percent of schools in Grade 3 and Grade 6. A 
Provincial breakdown reveals that suspicious school responses are noticeably higher in the 
Eastern Cape, the Free State and KwaZulu-Natal, and to some extent in Gauteng for Grade 6 
assessments. The manner in which schools behave suspiciously varies significantly by province, 
subject and measure. The V-ANA data shows more pronounced cheating with higher cheating 
measure values than those seen in the SACMEQ assessment. Cheating seems to be more 
prominent in Mathematics assessments compared to Language as is noted in international 
literature on high stakes subjects.  
This method is only possible on data that is recorded at the item-level, and a bigger effort should 
therefore be made to record at least a sub-sample of each educational dataset in order to 
improve access to such analysis. All suitably recorded educational datasets available such as 
TIMSS and PIRLS should be analysed for suspicious response patterns and not assumed to 
provide valid performance measures so as to improve upon or strengthen the findings presented 
here. This would help identify baseline cheating measure values, allow for a more detailed 
analysis on the determinants of cheating and add a further layer of validity to international or 
national assessment results. It would be particularly interesting in South Africa to apply these 
measures to a sub-sample of the Grade 12 school-leavers examination as these assessments 
involve high personal stakes for students and are regarded highly by potential universities. 
With respect to the ANAs, it is vital that these assessments continue. The ANAs are an 
important tool in analysing the problems teachers and students face lower down in the 
educational system. By highlighting these problems in the early phases of education, corrective 
solutions can be implemented which will allow for effective “teaching and learning, improved 
literacy and numeracy at schools, better National Senior Certificate examination performance as 
well as expanding early childhood development” (Department of Basic Education, 2013, p.1). In 
future a concerted effort should be made to record the class data of these assessments in a 
uniform manner to ensure that specific classrooms and therefore teachers can be identified as 
cheater classrooms. It would also be useful if students could be tracked across years as this 
would allow the use of additional Jacob and Levitt cheating measures.  
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The literature suggests that high stakes testing and measurement distort intrinsic motivation and 
induce negative behavioural distortions. These unfortunate unintended consequences, however, 
can be seen even in no-stakes or low-stakes assessments like the Annual National Assessments. 
This suggests that the mere act of assessment and measurement is perceived as a stake by 
teachers and educational personnel. Better methods of assessment implementation need to be 
explored to improve testing and increase educational quality without compromising the 
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Grade 6 First Additional Language 
Question Item Marks
1 1 1
2 2 1
3 3 1
4 4 1
5 5 1
6 6 2
7 7 2
8 8 2
9 9 1
10 10 1
11 11 1
12 12 1
13 13 1
14 14 1
15 15 2
16 16 1
17 17 2
18 18 1
19 19 1
20 20 2
21 21 1
22 22 1
23.1 23 2
23.2 24 3
24.1 25 1
24.2 26 1
25 27 2
26 28 1
27.1 29 1
27.2 30 1
28 31 1
29.1 32 1
29.2 33 1
30.1 34 1
30.2 35 1
31.1 36 1
31.2 37 1
32 38 1
33 39 1
34 40 1
35 41 1
36.1 42 1
36.2 43 1
37 44 6
38.1 45 5
38.2 46 5
38.3 47 5
38 47 75
